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I. INTRODUCTION:  “ZONING OUT” FOSSIL FUELS AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
A. Early Movers 
In August 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maine issued its final opinion upholding a South Portland 
zoning ordinance challenged by a fossil fuel company. 1   The 
sustained ordinance banned the loading of oil from a pipeline at 
 
1 Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 269 (D. Me. 
2018). 
PERRON-MACRO-040820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2020  2:11 PM 
2020] “Zoning Out” Climate Change 575 
 
the city’s main harbor, effectively rendering the pipeline 
useless.2 
Although the city justified the ordinance as merely a response 
to concerns about local air pollution and waterfront aesthetic, 
others saw the ordinance and its legal challenge as the 
battleground of a broader fight:  climate change.  The Natural 
Resources Council of Maine suggested this kind of victory by 
South Portland sends the “broader environmental message” that 
“multinational oil companies can no longer escape responsibility 
for the . . . climate change they cause.”3  The Conservation Law 
Foundation of Maine, which assisted with drafting the 
ordinance, similarly situated South Portland’s victory, saying 
that it “affirm[ed] the ability and obligation of local communities 
living on the frontlines of the climate battle to protect the health 
of their people, their natural resources, and the climate.”4 
The court and the litigants, however, barely mentioned 
climate change.  Instead, the court’s decision rested in part on 
the legitimacy of the City’s power to protect its citizens from the 
direct effects of inhaling particulate air pollution.5  Precisely 
because the court’s opinion delivered such a direct hit to the 
fossil fuel industry but was resolved without reference to climate 
change, it raised the interesting question of whether the 
motivation to mitigate climate change could alone legally justify 
a local zoning ordinance seeking to eliminate fossil fuel 
infrastructure. 
Across the country, another Portland took a similar approach.  
In 2016, Portland, Oregon adopted zoning amendments limiting 
expansion of fossil fuel terminals in the city.6  In contrast to 
South Portland, Maine, however, Portland, Oregon explicitly 
identified climate change as an important motivation for the 
amendments.  Portland’s City Council stated that it would 
 
2 Id. 
3 Jake A. Plante, South Portland is Making History with Its Clear Skies Fight, NAT. RES. 
COUNCIL ME. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nrcm.org/maine-environmental-news/south-
portland-making-history-clear-skies-fight/ [https://perma.cc/XXD5-8FZM]. 
4 Sean Mahoney, A Tale of Two Portlands, CONSERVATION L. FOUND. (Sep. 24, 2018), 
https://www.clf.org/blog/a-tale-of-two-portlands/ [https://perma.cc/SA9L-VPDF]. 
5 Portland Pipeline Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 304–08, 310–13. 
6  Fossil Fuel Terminal Zoning Amendments, CITY OF PORTLAND, 
https://beta.portland.gov/fossil-fuel-zoning [https://perma.cc/Z8PS-5S9U] (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2020). 
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“actively oppose expansion of [fossil fuel] infrastructure” 7 
because of its concerns about, among other things, “reducing the 
city’s contribution to greenhouse gasses, pollution, and climate 
change.”8  Like in Maine, the ordinance was challenged by the 
fossil fuel industry. 9   And like in Maine, the Oregon court 
resolved the dispute with reference to the traditional local safety 
concerns. 10   It too left unresolved the question of whether 
“prevent[ing] potential large fuel-export facilities, and thus, 
possibly reduc[ing] greenhouse gasses, is a legitimate local 
interest.”11 
South Portland and Portland are not alone in using their 
zoning law to “zone out” fossil fuel terminals in all or parts of 
their cities.  At least six other cities have adopted some kind of 
zoning law or regulation aimed at limiting fossil fuel 
operations.12  In March 2018, Baltimore, Maryland adopted a 
zoning ordinance, similar to Portland, Oregon’s, limiting 
expansion of fossil fuel terminals in the city.13  In January 2019, 
King County, Washington, which includes Seattle, passed a six-
month moratorium on major fossil fuel development projects.14  
Again, climate change activists have claimed the ordinances as 
victories.15 
 
7  PORTLAND, OR., FOSSIL FUEL INFRASTRUCTURE BCP-ENN-10.02 (2015), 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/citycode/article/557499 [https://perma.cc/NAH8-E9SS]. 
8 Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 262 (Or. Ct. App. 
Jan. 4, 2018). 
9 Id. at 261. 
10 Id. at 266. 
11 Id. at 267 n.7. 
12 John Talberth, Baltimore Set to Ban Crude Oil Infrastructure, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ECON. (Mar. 15, 2019), https://sustainable-economy.org/baltimore-set-ban-crude-oil-
infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/ZWL7-WQ95]. 
13 Id.; After Signing Crude Oil Terminal Bill, Pugh to Sign Polystyrene Ban Tomorrow, 
BALT. BREW (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2018/04/03/after-signing-
crude-oil-terminal-bill-pugh-to-sign-polystyrene-ban-tomorrow/ [https://perma.cc/4VEA-
YBMG]. 
14 Evan Bush, King County Council Approves 6-month Moratorium on Major Fossil-Fuel 
facilities, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/king-county-council-approves-6-month-moratorium-on-major-fossil-fuel-facilities/ 
[https://perma.cc/JM2U-3AKU]. 
15 Id.; After Signing Crude Oil Terminal Bill, Pugh to Sign Polystyrene Ban Tomorrow, 
BALT. BREW (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2018/04/03/after-signing-
crude-oil-terminal-bill-pugh-to-sign-polystyrene-ban-tomorrow/ [https://perma.cc/4VEA-
YBMG] (Leah Kelly, attorney for the Environmental Integrity Project:  “[T]he passage of 
the ordinance] proves that local governments can take real steps to fight climate 
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B. Moving Forward 
Cities’ efforts to use zoning laws to ban fossil fuel 
infrastructure demonstrates zoning’s potential viability in the 
fight against climate change.  These efforts already have, and 
will continue to, inspire other climate-minded cities to imitate 
these actions.  Indeed, a vice president of the Conservation Law 
Foundation of Maine suggested that the South Portland 
ordinance could be used as “a model for other communities to 
protect local interests from those who seek to do harm.” 16  
However, while courts have concluded that more traditional 
safety concerns are legitimate justifications for zoning laws 
hostile to fossil fuel infrastructure, they have yet to decide 
whether a zoning ordinance—hostile to fossil fuels and justified 
on climate change mitigation alone—would be upheld. This Note 
refers to such a hypothetical local ordinance, a potential model 
for climate-minded cities, as a “zoning out” ordinance.  A “zoning 
out” ordinance is a local ordinance that prohibits expansion of 
fossil fuel operations and infrastructure (e.g., export terminals, 
pipelines) within the local jurisdiction, and is justified not by 
traditional safety concerns, but solely as a means to mitigate 
climate change. 
The question of whether climate change mitigation is a 
sufficient justification for local zoning law and whether such a 
“zoning out” ordinance can survive legal challenge is the focus of 
this Note.  Three considerations motivate this focus on a 
hypothetical “zoning out” ordinance premised on climate change 
alone.  First, some cities may want to pass such ordinances but 
may not be able to persuade a court that the prohibited fossil 
fuel infrastructure would pose traditional health and safety 
risks.  Second, a related point, fossil fuel companies may adapt 
their technologies and practices to mitigate their contribution to 
traditional health and safety risks, like particulate air pollution, 
 
change.”); Dharna Noor, Another County Just Banned New Fossil Fuel Infrastructure, 
REAL NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 30, 2018), https://therealnews.com /stories/another-county-
just-banned-new-fossil-fuel-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/5PN8-JSN3]. 
16  Randy Billings, South Portland’s ‘Clear Skies’ Ordinance Survives Challenge as 
Federal Judge Finds It Constitutional, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/08/24/federal-court-rules-south-portland-ordinance-
does-not-violate-u-s-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/76XC-R6T7]. 
PERRON-MACRO-040820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2020  2:11 PM 
578 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:2 
 
to avoid challenges based on these traditional concerns.  Third, 
and most importantly, it remains an open question whether 
courts will consider climate change an appropriate target of local 
zoning power. 
Ultimately, this Note argues that municipalities can likely 
pass valid “zoning out” ordinances because climate change is a 
threat to a municipality’s health, safety, and welfare, which are 
interests traditionally protected by local zoning.  Municipalities 
may, however, face nontrivial difficulty demonstrating that the 
ordinances are substantially related to their climate change 
mitigation goal because of the disparate scale of global climate 
change and the effects of an ordinance’s prohibitions.  This Note 
also argues that these “zoning out” ordinances are not likely to 
offend the Dormant Commerce Clause because they will 
generally operate even-handedly with respect to similarly 
situated in-state and out-of-state actors, and although they 
incidentally burden interstate commerce, they will do so in a 
manner that advances a legitimate local interest (i.e., climate 
change mitigation) and only marginally affects the interstate 
fossil fuel market.  These ordinances are not likely to be 
preempted by federal law.  Finally, this Note argues that, given 
the history of land use as a traditional local power, the lack of 
federal climate change policy, and the current oil transportation 
regime, Congress should not preempt “zoning out” ordinances.  
However, if a patchwork of ordinances were to substantially 
threaten the interstate energy market, then the federal 
government should pass legislation regulating local zoning 
prohibitions on fossil fuel infrastructure. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Problem and the Lack of a Federal Solution 
Given the extent of the threat of climate change and the lack 
of meaningful federal efforts to mitigate the threat, it is not 
surprising that cities develop their own climate change policies.  
The scientific consensus that humans are the cause of climate 
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change is very strong:  peer-reviewed studies show that 97% or 
more of actively publishing scientists agree.17 
The current and potential impacts of climate change are wide 
ranging.  Since 1900, global sea level has risen by about 7–8 
inches and is expected to continue to rise.18  Daily tidal flooding 
is increasing in more than twenty-five Atlantic and Gulf Coast 
cities, the frequency of extreme flooding associated with coastal 
storms is likely to increase, and the intensities of Atlantic 
hurricanes are reasonably likely to increase.19   Furthermore, 
heatwaves and large forest fires are occurring more frequently, 
and chronic, long-durations droughts are becoming increasingly 
possible.20  These risks are especially acute for those situated in 
densely-populated urban areas, 21  particularly those that are 
coastal. 
Notwithstanding the scientific consensus on these ongoing and 
potential threats, the federal policy response to climate change 
has been weak.  For example, the most concentrated effort by 
Congress to pass climate change legislation—a proposed federal 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) cap-and-trade program—failed in the 
first years of the Obama Presidency.22  Instead, federal climate 
change policymaking has been mostly limited to rulemaking 
permitted under the Clean Air Act,23 a law that was not initially 
meant to address climate change24 but regulates emissions from 
motor vehicles and stationary sources like power plants.25  While 
 
17 Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/ 
scientific-consensus/ [https://perma.cc/TA66-TJJ2] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
18  U. S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT, 
FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 10 (2017). 
19 Id. at 1, 18.  The claim that extreme flooding associated with coastal storms is likely 
to increase is based on the assumption that storm characteristics do not change.  Id. at 
18. 
20 Id. at 27. 
21  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  
SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 15 (2014). 
22 William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 
2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1074–78 (2017) (discussing legislative history of potential federal 
cap-and-trade bill). 
23 Id. at 1078. 
24  Congress and Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLS., 
https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-and-climate-chang/ [https://perma.cc/5YA5-
4B97] (last visited (Feb. 2, 2020). 
25 Clean Air Act Requirements and History, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.ep 
a. gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-requirements-and-history [https://perma.cc/ 
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climate change proponents have won some victories under the 
Clean Air Act,26 the Trump Administration proposed a roll back 
to the Clean Power Plan,27 which was the “highest visibility and 
most embattled” climate change policy measure put forward by 
the Obama Administration under the Clean Air Act.28  It is true 
there are other federal statutes that can be used to mitigate the 
causes of climate change. 29   However, on the whole, federal 
actors lack a robust legal toolset to slow GHG emissions and 
mitigate climate change.  Even more, the Trump Administration 
has announced its intentions of withdrawing from the Paris 
Accord, signaling the Administration’s low-prioritization of 
global alignment on the climate change effort.30  With mixed 
messages from the Trump Administration, and the high-
politicization of the issue, it is unknown if and when federal 
lawmakers will move forward with climate change policy.  The 
lack of federal action leaves a climate change policy void that 
state and local lawmakers can seek to fill. 
 
PK9A-RMLS] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
26 Buzbee, supra note 22, at 1074–75, 1078–81 (citing Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), and EPA’s Endangerment Finding as examples of litigation 
and administrative action that expanded the EPA’s role in regulating GHGs; discussing 
the Clean Power Plan as an effort to put forth climate change regulation via EPA action 
under the Clean Air Act). 
27  Id. at 1081; Proposal: Affordable Clean Energy Rule, U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/proposal-affordable-clean-energy-
ace-rule [https://perma.cc/93Y4-9RWY] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
28 See Buzbee, supra note 22, at 1078. 
29 See 4 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AM. LAW ZONING § 37.3 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, which set fuel economy standards for vehicles 
and mandatory renewable fuel standards for fuel producers); Nicole Rushovich, Climate 
Change and Environmental Policy:  An Analysis of the Final Guidance on Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act 
Reviews, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 327, 332–33, 355–56 (2018) (discussing the National 
Energy Policy Act and its requirements on a federal agency proposing a project that will 
have a major impact on the environment to prepare an environmental statement 
considering alternative actions, but not requiring the agency to choose a more climate-
friendly alternative). 
30 See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-
agreement.html [https://perma.cc/65GS-FTNY]. 
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B. Cities as Actors in the Fight Against Climate Change 
Forward-looking cities have already moved to fill the climate 
policy void left by the federal government.  Over 400 mayors in 
the United States have committed their cities to meeting the 
goals set out in the Paris Agreement, in spite of the President’s 
statements. 31   Each of the five most populous United States 
cities have joined C40, a collaborative network of the world’s 
“megacities” that requires its members to set GHG reduction 
targets, develop climate action plans, and share best practices 
with other members.32  Additionally, one hundred cities have 
pledged to transition to 100% clean, renewable energy sources.33 
Many of these C40 cities and others have also taken direct 
action.  For instance, six cities in the United States have already 
transitioned to 100% renewable energy.34   Outside of energy 
planning, cities have implemented carbon taxes, have tried to 
hybridize their taxi fleets, and have attached green building 
requirements to their building codes. 35   Recently, a wave of 
litigation by cities in several states seeks to hold fossil fuel 
companies accountable for the effects of climate change, 
requesting court ordered remedies like compensatory damages, 
reimbursement for the city climate change adaption plans, and 
abatement of sea level rise nuisances.36  Cities, like New York, 
 
31  438 US Climate Mayors Commit to Adopt, Honor, and Uphold Paris Climate 
Agreement Goals, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org/actions/paris-climate-
agreement [https://perma.cc/PW3M-TEDH] (last updated Nov. 27, 2019, 3:00 PM). 
32  C40 CITIES, C40 CITIES ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2017), https://c40-production-
images.s3.amazonaws.com/other_uploads/images/2056_C40_ANNUAL_REPORT_2017.
original.pdf?1544802871 [https://perma.cc/N7LW-RS9H]; See C40 Cities, C40 CITIES, 
https://www.c40.org/cities [https://perma.cc/7P5H-CXCS]. 
33 See Jodie Van Horn, 100 Cities Agree: 100% Clean Energy For All, SIERRA CLUB (Dec. 
5, 2018), https://www.sierraclub.org/compass/2018/12/100-cities-agree-100-clean-
energy-for-all [https://perma.cc/3XR8-WF27]. 
34  See 100% Commitments in Cities, Counties, & States, SIERRA CLUB, 
https://www.sierraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments? [https://perma.cc/7QYA-ARAQ] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
35  See Michael Burger, “It’s Not Easy Being Green”:  Local Initiatives, Preemption 
Problems and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835, 865–66 (2010); 
John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 36 REAL EST. L.J. 
211, 226–27 (2007). 
36 See, e.g., Complaint, California v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17-571370, 2017 WL 4161895 
(Sup. Ct. Cal. filed Sep. 19, 2017); Complaint, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 
No. 17CIV03222, 2017 WL 3048970 (Sup. Ct. Cal. filed July 17, 2017). 
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have also used zoning law to shape urban land uses that are 
consistent with climate change mitigation strategies.37 
Some cities have pursued environmental land use goals 
through “smart growth.”  The American Planning Association 
defines smart growth as development “which supports choice 
and opportunity by promoting efficient and sustainable land 
development, incorporates redevelopment patterns that 
optimize prior infrastructure investments, and consumes less 
land . . . .”38  An important concept embedded in smart growth is 
impact analysis, which is “the process of examining a particular 
land development proposal and analyzing the impact it will have 
on a community,” 39  an example of which is required 
environmental reviews that consider a proposed development’s 
environmental impact.  Another important concept embedded in 
smart growth is sustainable development, which plans for 
communities to be “maintained into the indefinite future 
without degrading community institutions, the means of 
production,” infrastructure, the resource base, and the 
environment.40  While this focus on smart growth can reduce 
GHGs, the concerns at the core of these more traditional smart 
growth concepts are typically local.  By contrast, “zoning out” 
ordinances have the primary goal of mitigating climate change.  
Thus, these “zoning out” ordinances may have a broader effect 
on commerce and the environment outside the immediate 
locality.  The recent trend of cities using their zoning laws to 
directly target fossil fuel operations may suggest that climate-
focused cities desire to extend traditional smart growth zoning 
principles to encompass more outward-looking goals and 
measures.  These outward-looking measures seek to leverage a 
city’s strategic geographic position important to fossil fuel 
transportation, by making the city unavailable to fossil fuel 
infrastructure. 
 
37 See, e.g., Nolon & Bacher, supra note 35, at 212. 
38  See APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, AM. PLANNING ASS’N (April 14, 2012), 
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/smartgrowth.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5NJF-ZDEZ]. 
39  Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and 
Development Regulation Law § 9:1 295 (3d ed. 2018). 
40 See id. at 296. 
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C. Special Circumstance of Coastal Cities 
While observers can agree that local initiatives designed to 
mitigate climate change have an important symbolic function, 
they have been more skeptical that subnational climate change 
initiatives can play an important role in practically solving the 
problem.  This is because climate change is a classic “tragedy of 
the commons” problem in which no single actor is incentivized to 
reduce their fossil fuel consumption because their decrease alone 
is likely insufficient to solve the collective problem and may only 
put them at an economic disadvantage.41  Through this lens, 
Kirsten Engel suggests that local actions are particularly 
powerless in solving this international issue, and thus 
“irrational,” because they can have no meaningful impact on 
global GHG emissions. 42   Jonathan Adler agrees that 
subnational actors, like states, cannot “adopt[] emission controls 
capable of making a dent in . . . global [GHG] emissions,” and, 
therefore, cannot meaningfully address the “transboundary 
concern[]” of climate change.43  However, recent research rebuts 
these assumptions, suggesting cities may in fact have power to 
substantially contribute to GHG reduction.  For one, research 
has shown that cities emit 70% of the world’s carbon dioxide.44  
Further, in 2015, a city climate leadership group suggested that 
“urban policy decisions before 2020 could determine up to a third 
of the remaining [safe] global carbon budget that is not already 
‘locked-in’ by past decisions.”45 
 
41 See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons:  
The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 190–91 (2005); see also 
ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE LITIGATION:  LAW AND PRACTICE § 27:15 (2018). 
42 Engel & Saleska, supra note 41, at 192. 
43 See Jonathan H. Adler, Climate Balkanization: Dormant Commerce and the Limits of 
State Energy, 3 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 153, 162–63 (2014).   
44 Stephen Leahy, Cities Emit 60% More Carbon Than Thought, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(March 6, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/03/city-consumption-
greenhouse-gases-carbon-c40-spd/ [https://perma.cc/UK7C-84CD]. 
45 Press Release: One Third of the World’s Remaining Safe Carbon Budget Could be 
Determined by Urban Policy Decision in the Next Five Years, C40 CITIES (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.c40.org/press_releases/one-third-of-the-world-s-remaining-safe-carbon-
budget-could-be-determined-by-urban-policy-decisions-in-the-next-five-years 
[https://perma.cc/3J5S-TSZM].  The city climate leadership group, “C40,” describes the 
“global carbon budget” as the amount of carbon dioxide that can be emitted without 
creating an “unacceptable risk of run-away climate change”.  Id. 
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Even assuming, however, some general constraints on cities’ 
ability to contribute to GHG reduction, cities that hold key 
positions as nodes in the system of fossil fuel transportation may 
be able to have an outsized influence on access to fossil fuels in 
and outside their jurisdictions.  By “zoning out” fossil fuel 
operations at an important juncture in the transportation 
system, cities could potentially disrupt this transportation 
system.  Such a disruption could force fossil fuel companies to 
develop new routes around the “zoned out” city or region, or even 
to abandon infrastructure investments in these areas 
altogether.  This may have the ultimate effect of raising fossil 
fuel transportation costs, and therefore fossil fuel prices. 46  
Increased costs would make fossil fuel a less attractive fuel 
source in the interstate and international market.  If enough 
coastal cities, in tandem, adopted zoning laws which made ports 
and export terminals inaccessible to fossil fuel transporters, this 
movement could make an appreciable difference on the price of 
fossil fuels and therefore on national and global consumption.47  
If effective, a patchwork of collective action by municipal actors 
might work to reduce fossil fuel consumption inside and outside 
their jurisdictions. 
Not only are coastal cities strategically positioned to exact 
leverage on the fossil fuel industry if legally able, but because of 
their vulnerabilities to climate change, they may also be poised 
to act.  Robert R.M. Verchick suggests that the urgency of 
climate change is most compellingly communicated when 
framed in terms of local issues, and notes that local clean-energy 
initiatives benefit from advocates being able to frame the issue 
 
46 See Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 288 F. Supp. 2d 321, 340 (D. 
Me. 2017) (“PPLC determined that, upon reversing the flow if its eighteen-inch pipeline, 
PPLC would be the only terminal on the United States east coast capable of importing 
and exporting Canadian oil sand crude.”); see also Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of 
South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 309 (D. Me. 2018) (acknowledging that the 
ordinance could have an impact on global oil prices, if only a “little impact”). 
47 Zahara Hirji, Portland Bans New Fossil Fuel Infrastructure in Stand Against Climate 
Change, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/ 
news/14122016/portland-oregon-ban-fossil-fuels-oil-and-gas-pipelines-coal-global-
warming [https://perma.cc/9ZQA-KZF3] (Portland Mayor Charlie Hayes, speaking after 
the passage of the fossil fuel operations ban, said that if other communities took similar 
action, these actions would “start[] to have a profound effect that’s far more than local.”). 
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with the local benefits that accrue.48  Although he argues that, 
generally, climate change adaption, rather than mitigation, is 
more easily framed through local issues, 49  climate change 
mitigation initiatives in coastal cities can perhaps more easily 
be framed in terms of local concerns as compared to the same 
initiatives in more inland, less urban areas.  Cities are likely to 
suffer the effects of rising sea levels and flooding, as well as a 
myriad of other climate change issues that disproportionally 
harm coastal, urban areas.  Verchick’s argument may support 
the idea that coastal cities who can better appreciate the 
potential harms of climate change will be more likely to support 
climate change efforts like “zoning out” ordinances. 
D. Case Studies 
This Note surveys two main case studies:  South Portland, 
Maine and Portland, Oregon.  These cities’ fossil fuel zoning 
ordinances were challenged in cases which have been decided on 
the merits.  Although the ordinances were justified on 
alternative and additional bases other than climate change 
mitigation, the case studies are useful in evaluating the legality 
of a hypothetical “zoning out” ordinance because the courts 
resolved many of the same questions that would likely arise in a 
challenge to a “zoning out” ordinance.  The facts of the case 
studies mirror much of what a challenge to a “zoning out” 
ordinance might look like. 
An ongoing challenge to an Oakland, California fossil fuel 
zoning ordinance, although not resolved on the pertinent 
Constitutional issues, is also useful for its facts and the parties’ 
positions on the issues in briefing.50 
1. South Portland, Maine 
The dispute in South Portland, Maine was between city 
lawmakers and operators of an oil pipeline. 51   The South 
 
48 See Robert R.M. Verchick, Culture, Cognition, and Climate, 2016 ILL. L. REV. 969, 972, 
1006 (2016). 
49 Id. at 972. 
50 Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 
(N.D. Cal. 2018). 
51 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 288 F. Supp. 3d at 329. 
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Portland City Council passed a zoning ordinance designed to 
prohibit loading of crude oil from the oil pipeline onto marine 
tanker vessels docked in the city’s harbor.52  The pipeline runs 
from oil refineries in Montreal East, Quebec to South Portland, 
Maine.53  The American section of the pipeline is operated by 
Portland Pipe Line Company (“PPLC”).54  Except for a roughly 
ten-year period when the pipeline operator reoriented the 
pipeline to allow for oil transport from Quebec to South 
Portland,55 the pipeline has been configured to pump oil north 
from South Portland to Quebec.56  However, in the years 2007 
and 2008, PPLC recognized that an oil boom in Alberta’s oil 
sands would substantially decrease demand for oil transport to 
Canada, and would instead stoke demand for oil transport from 
Canada to the United States east coast.57  With this evolution in 
mind, PPLC explored a project that would reverse the flow of oil 
in its pipeline system, allowing it to import oil from Canada into 
the United States.58  The company eventually tabled the plans 
in the midst of the global recession in 2008.59 
PPLC revisited its reversal plans in 2012 and 2013. 60  
However, at this time, PPLC became aware of political 
opposition, both at the Congressional and local level.61  At the 
local level, a grassroots movement of pipeline opponents 
acquired enough signatures to put a Waterfront Protection 
Ordinance (“WPO”) on the November 2013 South Portland 
ballot. 62   The proposed WPO, which would have prohibited 
reversal of the PPLC pipeline, was eventually rejected by 
voters. 63   However, in November 2013, the City Council 
 
52 Id. at 382–85. 
53 Id. at 332–33.  In fact, the Portland Pipe Line Corporation actually operates two 
different pipelines that run side-by-side and it is not entirely clear which of the two would 
be the subject of this project.  However, for the purposes of the Note I will refer to the 
two pipelines collectively as “the pipeline.” 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 338. 
56 Id. at 339. 
57 Id. at 339–40. 
58 Id. at 339–49. 
59 Id. at 342–43. 
60 Id. at 349. 
61 Id. at 353–56. 
62 Id. at 355. 
63 Id. at 355–56. 
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discussed the need to pass a related moratorium, and in 
December, the City Council passed a temporary moratorium on 
development proposals that involved the loading of oil, giving 
them time “to determine the . . . implications” of such projects.64  
In July 2014, a draft ordinance committee recommended to the 
City Council the text of the “Clear Skies Ordinance,” which 
effectively prohibited PPLC from loading oil onto marine tankers 
in South Portland.65  The City Council passed the ordinance on 
July 21, 2014.66 
The ordinance’s legislative findings suggest it was intended to 
mitigate potential health hazards and protect the waterfront 
aesthetic.67  The findings state that “air pollutants associated 
with . . . bulk loading of crude oil” “present . . . a threat 
of . . . serious human health effects, including cancer, 
reproductive dysfunction, or birth defects.”68  The findings also 
suggest that “expanded land use . . . for the bulk loading of crude 
oil . . . would adversely impact the balance of mixed-uses on the 
waterfront.”69  Mindful of these concerns, the Ordinance bans 
“the storing and handling of petroleum” for the “bulk loading of 
crude oil onto any marine vessel” in designated areas, including 
the harbor in which PPLC would have loaded imported oil.70  
The ordinance also bans the expansion of facilities designed to 
enable the loading of bulk crude oil in designated areas.71  In the 
litigation challenging the ordinance, the District Court noted 
that given the lack of demand for oil in Canada, PPLC could not 
likely have survived as a business if it was not able to reverse 
the flow of its pipeline. 72   Therefore, the zoning ordinance 
effectively blocks the use of the pipeline in the national and 
international oil markets. 73   Given these consequences, the 
pipeline operators filed suit challenging the legality of the 
 
64 Id. at 356–59. 
65 Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 281–82 (D. 
Me. 2018). 
66 Id. 
67 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 288 F. Supp. 3d at 383–84. 
68 Id. at 383. 
69 Id. at 384. 
70 Id. at 384–85, 377. 
71 Id. at 385. 
72 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 284. 
73 Id. at 309–10. 
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ordinance.74  As mentioned, the District Court ultimately upheld 
the ordinance.75 
2. Portland, Oregon 
The zoning policies of Portland, Oregon differ from those of 
South Portland in two main respects:  (1) the Portland policies 
adopted a more general and comprehensive ban on fossil fuel 
operations; and (2) the Portland policy-makers explicitly 
identified larger-scale concerns about global climate change as a 
justification for the zoning policy.  However, like in South 
Portland, a grassroots movement of environmental activists set 
in motion the series of events that ultimately led to the city’s 
adoption of the zoning policy.76 
The movement began in the fall of 2014 as opposition to Mayor 
Charlie Hales’s public support for the Port of Portland’s 
proposed deal with Pembina Corporation to develop a propane 
export terminal.77  The city held a hearing, well attended by 
opponents to the project, on a proposed amendment to an 
environmental regulation that was required for the propane 
project to go forward.78  Environmental advocates, voicing their 
opposition at this public hearing and at other mayoral events, 
drew media attention to the issue and pressured the mayor.79  In 
May 2015, Hales, citing 3,000 public comments opposing the 
propane project, withdrew his support for it.80  In November 
2015, in the aftermath of the Pembina reversal and other 
sustained protests and petitioning by activists, the City of 
Portland passed Resolution 37168.81 
Resolution 37168 announces it is Portland’s policy to “actively 
oppose expansion of infrastructure whose primary purpose is 
transporting or storing fossil fuels in or through Portland or 
 
74 Id. at 264; Portland Pipe Line Corp., 288 F. Supp. 3d at 321. 
75 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 269. 
76  NICHOLAS CALEB, 350PDX, MAKING A DIFFERENCE:  STOPPING FOSSIL FUEL 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS TRACKS, (2017). 
77 Id. at 5–6. 
78 Id. at 5. 
79 Id. at 5–6. 
80 Id. at 6. 
81 Id. at 9–12. 
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adjacent waterways.” 82   The Resolution requires the city’s 
Bureau of Planning and Sustainability (“BPS”) to develop zoning 
code amendments that achieve the policy goals of the 
resolution.83  The zoning amendments were also guided by the 
City’s comprehensive plan, which stated that it was the City’s 
policy to “limit fossil fuel distribution and storage facilities to 
those necessary to serve the regional market.”84 
On December 14, 2016, the city eventually adopted, with some 
changes, zoning amendments proposed by BPS.  The 
amendments created a new land use category called “Bulk Fossil 
Fuel Terminals,” and prohibited all new “Bulk Fossil Fuel 
Terminals” that store two million gallons of fuel or more, while 
providing exceptions for oil storage facilities with such capacities 
at places like airports and gas stations. 85   The amendments 
allowed “Existing Bulk Fossil Fuel Terminals” to operate as 
before, but prohibited existing terminals from expanding to a 
capacity greater than that which they had at the time of the 
amendments’ adoption.86 
The existing terminals supplied about 90% of Oregon’s fossil 
fuels, and some of the stored product was used to service nearby 
states.87  The ordinance therefore had the effect of locking in the 
infrastructure necessary to service Oregon’s needs and 
prohibiting expansion that would facilitate interstate and 
international fossil fuel trade.88  The ordinance was particularly 
important given the recent increase in United States crude oil 
production, and the industry’s desire to export this oil.89  If it 
were to stand, the ordinance would be a strong defense for 
Portland against the increased number of developer’s proposals 
to build fossil fuel export terminals on the Pacific Coast to serve 
international markets like Asia.90  The potential power of this 
ordinance drove the industry to challenge to the ordinance in 
 





87 Id. at 262–63. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 262. 
90 Id. 
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Oregon state court.91  Although the ordinance was ultimately 
blocked for noncompliance with procedural requirements of the 
state land use statute, the Court found that the ordinance did 
not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause.92  It did not, however, 
address the question of whether climate change mitigation was 
a proper target of local zoning law. 
3. Oakland and other Cities 
As mentioned above, at least six other cities have adopted 
some zoning law or regulation aimed at limiting the expansion 
of fossil fuel infrastructure. 93   Of these cities, Oakland, 
California serves as a particularly useful case study because its 
ordinance explicitly took aim at the burning of fossil fuels 
overseas.  In July 2016, Oakland passed an ordinance banning 
the loading, handling, and storage of coal at the city’s bulk 
material facilities.94  The ordinance’s legislative findings state 
the main purpose of the ordinance is to reduce safety and health 
risks associated with particulate air pollution from coal. 95  
However, the findings also state a purpose to reduce export of 
coal from Oakland which would be “combusted” overseas, thus 
causing the “increase of greenhouse gas emissions globally” that 
“would contribute incrementally to global climate change.” 96  
This ordinance was challenged by a developer who had recently 
leased land from the city on which he planned to build a coal 
export facility. 97   The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Northern California, deciding motions for summary judgement 
against the city, resolved the challenge on contractual grounds 
respecting the lease, but did not reach the Constitutional 
questions, such as whether the ordinance offended the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, or was otherwise preempted by federal law.98  
The ordinance suggests what a “zoning out” ordinance might 
 
91 Id. at 258. 
92 Id. at 272. 
93 Talberth, supra note 12. 
94 OAKLAND, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8.60.010 (2019). 
95 Id. at § 8.60.020 (2019). 
96 Id. 
97 Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 987–90. 
98 Id. at 991–92. 
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partly look like, given its explicit language prioritizing climate 
change mitigation. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This Section first considers the question of whether a “zoning 
out” ordinance could be properly passed by a municipality 
utilizing its zoning law.  It then considers the extent to which 
such an ordinance might conflict with federal law, either 
through violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause or by being 
preempted by federal statute or other law. 
A. Zoning 
1. The General Framework for Zoning Law 
A “zoning out” ordinance must necessarily fit within the 
permissible scope of zoning law to be valid.  The modern zoning 
ordinance was first held constitutional by the Supreme Court in 
the seminal zoning case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.99  
Euclid laid the legal framework for zoning, describing the 
sources of zoning law power and its underlying justifications. 
The legal challenge in Euclid was brought by a plaintiff who 
owned a tract of land on which Euclid’s new zoning ordinance 
banned industrial uses.100  The plaintiff sought to enjoin the 
ordinance, arguing that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
by depriving him of liberty and property without due process and 
denying him equal protection of the law.101  Finding the village 
had a rational basis for the zoning plan, which was premised on 
its authority to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of 
its inhabitants, the Supreme Court upheld the local 
ordinance.102 
The Court explained that the power to zone is justified as a 
means to protect the community.103  It stated that with “great 
increase and concentration of population,” urban problems 
 
99 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
100 Id. at 381–82. 
101 Id. at 384. 
102 Id. at 387–92, 395, 397. 
103 Id. at 386–88 (“Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our 
day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations . . . .”). 
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develop which “require . . . additional restrictions in respect of 
the use and occupation of private lands.”104  The Court grounded 
the power to implement such land use restriction in the states’ 
“police power, asserted for the public welfare.” 105  
Understanding the difficulty of determining which land use 
restrictions legitimately benefit the “public welfare” from those 
that do not, the Court suggested this analysis be informed by the 
legal maxim that “one should not use their land in such a way 
as to injure another” and the related law of nuisances.106 
The Court also required that a zoning ordinance bear a 
substantial relation to the goal of protecting the general 
welfare.107  The Court found the ordinance in question, which 
zoned separate neighborhoods for residential and industrial 
uses, would have effects including, but not limited to, reducing 
the risk of fire, preserving quiet spaces, and increasing the 
“safety and security of home life,” and thus had a “substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”108  However, only two years later, in the case Nectow v. 
City of Cambridge, the Supreme Court struck down a zoning 
ordinance, as applied to a portion of land that was restricted by 
the ordinance to residential uses, but neighbored industrialized 
lands.109  The court found the application of the ordinance to 
have no “substantial relation” to public welfare.110  The Court 
held that, as applied, the zoning plan “would not promote the 
health, safety, convenience, and general welfare” of the city’s 
inhabitants given the “character” of the surrounding industrial 
neighborhood and the minor benefit “accru[ing] to the whole 
city.”111 
Given Euclid’s status as the foundational zoning case, zoning 
ordinances justified on the basis of climate change must 
necessarily comport with its framework to defeat potential legal 
challenges posed by the fossil fuel industry. 
 
104 Id. at 387. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 391, 394–95. 
108 Id. at 394–95. 
109 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–89 (1928). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
PERRON-MACRO-040820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2020  2:11 PM 
2020] “Zoning Out” Climate Change 593 
 
2. A Municipality Must Consider its Source of Authority 
Euclid located the zoning power in the “police power,” so any 
local body seeking to pass a “zoning out” ordinance must first 
consider the extent to which they hold this police power.  The 
“police power”, which resides in states, includes the power to 
zone property for development.112  The states’ “police power” is 
unmentioned in the Constitution, but is recognized by judicial 
precedent as reserved to the states through the Tenth 
Amendment.113  Therefore, in order for local municipalities—
such as cities, towns, and counties—to possess the zoning power, 
their respective state governments must delegate the power to 
them.  However, all states have delegated this power to local 
municipalities in at least some respects.114 
The zoning power can be delegated from the state to local 
municipalities in several ways.  First, zoning authority can be 
delegated to local municipalities by way of a zoning enabling 
act.115  All fifty states have, at least at some point, enacted a 
zoning enabling act substantially modeled after the Standard 
State Zoning Act.116  The Standard State Zoning Act is a model 
statute, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, that 
delegates zoning authority “for the purposes of promoting 
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the 
community.”117  This model still supplies the institutional zoning 
structure in many states.118  Local zoning authority can also rest 
upon a broad “home rule” principal that is embedded in a state’s 
constitution or granted through legislation.119  For instance, the 
Constitution of Maine states that “inhabitants of any 
municipality shall have the power to alter and amend their 
charter on all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or general 
 
112 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535–36 (2012). 
113 Id. 
114 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE GOVERNANCE OF LAND USE: COUNTRY 
FACT SHEET UNITED STATES (2017), https://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/land-
use-United-States.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX3F-92VK]. 
115 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at § 3.5. 
116 Id. at § 3.6. 
117 Id. 
118 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and Standard City Planning Enabling Act, AM. 
PLANNING ASS’N, https://www.planning.org/growingsmart/enablingacts.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J94M-SD49] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).  
119 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at § 3.5. 
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law, which are local and municipal in character.”120  Finally, 
local zoning authority can be inferred through a general grant of 
the state’s “police power” to local municipalities via 
legislation.121 
Given the differing methods of delegating zoning power, any 
local municipality seeking to pass a “zoning out” ordinance must 
first understand whether the delegation of power to it by its 
respective state is broad enough to justify the proposed 
ordinance.  For instance, South Portland had ample authority to 
pass zoning ordinances as the Maine Court recognized that such 
ordinances are grounded in a “home rule” power—delegated to 
Maine municipalities by the state constitution and legislature—
that should be “liberally construed.”122  By contrast, in Oregon, 
land use authority by local governments is regulated by the 
state’s unique, environment-focused land use statute, the 
“Oregon Planning Act.” 123   Under this statute, local zoning 
ordinances must comply with enumerated statewide goals and 
certain procedural requirements.124  In fact, and ironically, it 
was Portland’s failure to comply with procedural requirements 
of the environmentally-minded Planning Act, which requires 
“adequate factual bases” in the legislative record for land use 
decisions, that ultimately led to the zoning ordinance’s 
invalidation.125 
As the case studies demonstrate, complying with the 
requirements of their respective state land use regimes is the 
critical first step for any municipality seeking to pass a “zoning 
out” ordinance.  Because these grants of power tend to be broad, 
delegated powers are likely to be sufficient foundations on which 
to pass a “zoning out” ordinance. 
 
120 ME. CONST., art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1. 
121 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at § 3.5. 
122 Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 321, 456 (D. Me. 
2018). 
123  7 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 
171.15 (Rev. Ed. 2018). 
124  See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.250 (2017) (“goals compliance”), 197.828 (“substantial 
evidence” requirement”) (2017). 
125 Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 268–71 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2018). 
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3. Local Zoning Laws Must Address Local Problems 
A “zoning out” municipality would need to show that the 
problem of climate change is sufficiently local so as to be 
properly addressed by zoning law.  A problem of global scale like 
climate change is not obviously a proper target of local zoning 
law.  However, existing zoning and climate change case law 
suggests that the local effects of climate change make climate 
change a sufficiently local problem so as to be appropriately 
targeted by zoning law. 
An intuition that zoning law should address local problems is 
borne out in the state-to-municipal delegations of zoning power 
as well as the relevant case law.  To the extent that zoning power 
is delegated to a municipality through a zoning statute or via 
“home rule” authority, this local power would not be granted to 
solve problems that cannot be considered “local.”  Taking up the 
issue, state courts have said that “the primary purpose of zoning 
is the preservation in the public interest of certain 
neighborhoods against uses . . . deleterious to such 
neighborhoods.”126  Indeed, Euclid itself reigned in the potential 
reach of zoning authority by stating that the question of whether 
something is the proper target of zoning law depends not on “an 
abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered 
apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances 
and the locality.”127  Thus, given this apparent requirement that 
zoning local law operate so as to address local problems, the 
question becomes whether climate change is a sufficiently local 
problem to be properly addressed by local zoning law. 
Although no court has addressed directly whether climate 
change is independently a sufficiently local problem to be 
targeted by zoning law, localized problems associated with 
climate change have traditionally been considered its proper 
targets.  For instance, controlling harm from flooding and fire 
are traditional aims of zoning law.128  Zoning goals have also 
included protecting appropriate provision of public 
 
126 Kaplan v. City of Boston, 113 N.E.2d 856, 858 (Mass. 1953) (emphasis added); see 
also Klensin v. City of Tuscon, 459 P.2d 316, 319 (Ariz. App. 1969). 
127 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added). 
128 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 7.4 
(4th ed. 2018); JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at § 3.17. 
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infrastructure to citizens.129  Cities have begun incorporating 
“coastal resilience” goals in comprehensive plans, and at least 
one author suggests local no-build zones, regulating 
development in the face of sea level rise, may be supported in 
light of the “coastal damage [climate change] portends”. 130  
Because these enumerated “symptoms” of climate change 
appear to be sufficiently local to be targeted by zoning law, it 
seems a proper extension that climate change itself, the 
underlying cause, be considered a sufficiently local target. 
Conducting this analysis, judges can also be guided by the 
discussions of several courts of the extent to which climate 
change is a local problem.  These discussions buttress the 
conclusion that climate change is an appropriate target of zoning 
law.  The local nature of climate change was considered by the 
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.  In that case, a 
collection of states, local governments, and private organizations 
alleged that the EPA abdicated its responsibility under the 
Clean Air Act to regulate GHGs from motor vehicles. 131  
Addressing the first prong of the standing analysis, the Court 
asked whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff state 
Massachusetts—an exacerbation of climate change caused by 
the EPA’s lack of regulation of GHGs—was a “cognizable 
injury.”132  Finding Massachusetts would have been injured by a 
lack of regulation of GHGs, the Court highlighted injuries 
Massachusetts suffers from climate change.133  The Court noted 
that Massachusetts alleged particularized harm by showing 
rising sea levels had “already begun to swallow Massachusetts’s 
coastal land,” and that if projections proved accurate, it would 
suffer increased remediation costs through rising sea levels and 
flooding. 134   The Court identified Massachusetts’s alleged 
injuries as those of both a landowner and a state sovereign with 
 
129 Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening State and Local 
Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and Preserve 
Resources for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 125 
(2009); JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at § 3.13. 
130 John R. Nolon, Sea-Level Rise and the Legacy of Lucas: Planning for an Uncertain 
Future, 66 PLANNING & ENVTL. L., Feb. 2014, at 4, 6. 
131 Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). 
132 Id. at 514–18. 
133 Id. at 521–23. 
134 Id. at 522–23. 
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interests “in all the earth and air within its domain.”135  The 
Court stated that just because the “climate-change risks [were] 
‘widely shared’ [did] not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the 
outcome of [the] litigation.”136 
Mitigating climate change has also been explicitly recognized 
as a “legitimate local purpose” by multiple judges evaluating a 
challenge of California’s low-carbon fuel standards by members 
of the ethanol industry.137  In a series of district court decisions 
and appeals in the case Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 
Corey, both a district court judge and a judge of the Ninth 
Circuit, reaching the question in the context of a dormant 
commerce clause analysis, asserted that they found California’s 
fuel standards to serve a legitimate local purpose of mitigating 
climate change.138  In support of this finding, Judge Murguia, 
concurring in the judgement of the Ninth Circuit, cited 
Massachusetts v. EPA and Maine v. Taylor’s suggestion that 
states had a “legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly 
understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that 
they may ultimately prove to be negligible.”139 
However, other courts have been more hostile to the notion 
that climate change causes localized problems.  For instance, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of the 
Interior, when considering whether Point Hope, a federally-
recognized native tribe in Alaska, had standing to challenge the 
Department of Interior’s expansion of oil and gas leasing 
operations, read narrowly the holding of Massachusetts v. 
EPA.140  Finding that Point Hope alleged no injury, the Court 
apparently limited that holding to state sovereigns, and 
 
135 Id. at 518–19. 
136 Id. at 522. 
137 See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234, 2011 WL 6936368, 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 
1071 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011). 
138 Id. 
139 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, J., concurring 
in part) (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986)) (citing Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516–21 (2007)). 
140 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 471–72, 475–79 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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presumably similarly situated entities, that could allege 
“personal” harm.141  The Court found that Point Hope did not 
demonstrate that “climate change would directly cause any 
diminution of Point Hope’s territory any more than anywhere 
else,”142 perhaps insinuating that climate change should only be 
considered a local issue to those communities that can show they 
suffer outsized land losses from rising sea levels. 
The federal district court of the District of Columbia in 
Wildearth Guardians v. Salazar was similarly hostile to the 
notion of climate change as a local problem. 143   Wildearth 
Guardians involved environmental organizations challenging 
the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s decision to lease federal 
land to coal mining operations. 144   There, the court rejected 
standing, finding a “disconnect between [the plaintiffs’] 
recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests, which are 
uniformly local, and the diffuse and unpredictable effects of 
GHG emissions.”145  The Wildearth Guardians court, in support 
of this finding, cited an opinion of the federal district court in 
New Mexico stating there is not a “generally accepted scientific 
consensus . . . with regard to what specific effects of climate 
change will be on individual geographic areas.”146 
The rationale of the climate change case law would arguably 
support, rather than undermine, a finding that the problem of 
climate change is sufficiently local to be targeted by zoning law.  
Coastal, urban municipalities that pass “zoning out” ordinances, 
given their proximity to the sea, are likely able to readily show, 
like Massachusetts, that they suffer the personal harm of rising 
sea levels whether it be through the engulfing of land or flooding, 
or both.  Any city passing a “zoning out” ordinance, on the basis 
of zoning power delegated from the state, would be exercising 
 
141 Id. at 475–79. 
142 Id. at 477. 
143 Wildearth Guardians v. Salazar, 880 F. Supp. 2d 77, 79 (D.D.C. 2012). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 84 (emphasis added). 
146 Id. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court suggested in dicta that it agreed that the 
plaintiffs could not establish standing based on global climate change.  Wildearth 
Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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this delegated power to protect the same sovereign interests in 
the “earth and air” that were at stake in Massachusetts.147 
However, to the extent a court, similar to Center for Biological 
Diversity, requires a municipality to point to a more distinct local 
harm to justify its use of zoning law, a city that has not yet lost—
or has lost little land—to rising sea levels may have a harder 
time making this showing.  Yet, such a distinct harm 
requirement would break down in front of a judge, even a 
climate-skeptical one, who heeds the Supreme Court’s 
suggestion in Maine v. Taylor that local actors have an interest 
in “guarding against imperfectly understood environmental 
risks.”148  Further, to the extent a challenger relied on reasoning 
similar to that of Wildearth Guardians—suggesting parties may 
be unable to trace localized climate change harms to a particular 
region—such reasoning would fall flat in front of the judge who 
recognizes the evidence showing the widespread reach of climate 
change effects. 
4. Local Zoning Laws Must be Motivated by a Substantively 
Proper Purpose 
A separate but related question also unaddressed by courts is 
whether the sole climate change mitigation purpose of a “zoning 
out” ordinance fits within the health, safety, and public welfare 
purposes of zoning law.  Because the scope of these purposes is 
broad, and climate change can pose meaningful threats to each, 
climate change mitigation should be considered an appropriate 
zoning purpose. 
While early zoning efforts focused on public health were 
typically concerned with things like fire and traffic safety, 
eventually the public health rationale was broadened to 
encompass zoning plans that encouraged activities like walking 
and biking. 149   Although commentators suggest that urban 
developmental plans have been instrumental in reducing GHGs, 
these commentators also note that climate change mitigation, 
until recently, has not been a traditional objective of such 
 
147 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19. 
148 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148. 
149 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS., supra note 39, at §§ 3.17, 9.1. 
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projects. 150   Mitigation of air pollution and environmental 
protection, however, have traditionally been considered proper 
subjects of the zoning power.151 
So, a recognition of climate change mitigation as a proper 
substantive subject of zoning law would require courts to extend 
the public health, safety, and welfare rationale, past urban 
planning and traditional environmental protection, to climate 
change mitigation.  Such an extension of the zoning law would 
not be judicial overreach.  The need for future expansion of the 
zoning power was explicitly recognized by Euclid.  The Euclid 
court explained that zoning law should adapt with the times, 
noting that “a degree of elasticity” should be imparted when 
determining the scope of zoning law.152  This flexibility is needed 
to “meet the new and different conditions which are constantly 
coming within the field of [police power] operation” as society 
develops.153  Thus, today’s courts are directed by Euclid to use 
judgement to determine whether a new aim by localities, like 
climate change mitigation, falls within the police power.  
Scholars have recognized the importance of such official 
appreciation of climate change’s threat to public health, arguing 
that “achieving public health goals in relationship to climate 
change effects will mean somehow persuading decisions makers 
of their present relevance.”154 
The EPA’s 2009 endangerment finding would likely be a 
sufficient basis on which a court could identify climate change 
as a threat to public health and safety.  This EPA finding 
concluded that GHG emissions were air pollutants contributing 
to climate change and threatening public health and welfare.155  
 
150 Nolon & Bacher, supra note 35, at 212, 215–16. 
151 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 217 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Air pollution prevention falls under the broad police powers of the states, which include 
the power to protect the health of citizens in the state.”); see 8 MCQUILLIN THE LAW OF 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25:24 (3d ed. 2019). 
152 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. 
153 Id. 
154  Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, Introduction to CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC 
HEALTH, AND THE LAW 5 (Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach eds., 2018) (exploring the 
relationship between public health and climate change). 
155  Endangerment and Cause of Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 FR 66,496-01, 66,497 (U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Dec. 15, 2009), 2018 WL 4767932. 
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The EPA further concluded that GHG-induced climate change 
wrought several potential public health threats including 
increased heat waves, increased extreme weather events like 
cyclones and flooding, and dirtier air.156  With respect to more 
general public welfare threats, the EPA warned that climate 
change threatened to increase disruptions to food production 
and agriculture, endanger the adequacy of the water supply, 
submerge and flood low-lying coastal lands with greater 
frequency, and increase the frequency of extreme weather 
events that could threaten energy and transportation 
infrastructure.157 
Thus, the EPA’s finding is strong authority for a locality 
seeking to justify its use of zoning law to mitigate climate change 
under a public health or welfare rationale, given that the risks 
presented by the EPA would threaten the public safety of any 
local municipality.  Coastal cities, in particular, whose 
geographic position makes them most likely to pass such “zoning 
out” ordinances, are likely to be disproportionally burdened by 
the risks identified by the EPA such as flooding, submerging of 
coastal land, and extreme weather threats to infrastructure. 
The extent to which climate change will be recognized as 
threatening public health and welfare is central in the case 
Juliana v. United States. In Juliana, plaintiffs are suing the 
federal government for condoning production and use of fossil 
fuels that exacerbate climate change.158  The plaintiffs alleged 
several injuries the district court recognized as “cognizable,” 
including:  injuries from flooding and extreme weather, 
deterioration of water and food supply, and harm to recreational 
interests.159  A decision for the plaintiffs would signal a court’s 
willingness to recognize GHGs emissions as a direct threat to 
the welfare interests zoning law protects. 
Ultimately, given the scientific evidence and state of the 
relevant law, a locality would likely be able to show that the 
harms caused by climate change threaten local health and 
welfare. 
 
156 Id. at 66,524. 
157 Id. at 66,530–31. 
158 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016). 
159 Id. at 1242–44. 
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5. Local Zoning Ordinance Must Be Substantially Related to 
a Proper Purpose 
The third, final, and most demanding threshold a “zoning out” 
ordinance would have to satisfy is whether the ordinance bore a 
“substantial relation” to public health, safety, and welfare.160  
Because the standards for determining whether local zoning 
legislation is substantially related to its purpose tend to be 
deferential and the circumstances of climate change make 
deference to local legislatures appropriate, a municipality may 
be able to show that a “zoning out” ordinance is substantially 
related to mitigating climate change. 
This substantial relation requirement is a feature of the 
substantive due process requirements of both federal and state 
constitutions.161  For federal due process challenges, ordinances 
need only pass the deferential “minimum rationality” test, under 
which the ordinance is considered “substantially related” to its 
purpose if the court finds “any conceivable, rational basis in fact 
or logic linking [the ordinance] with its intended objective or 
purpose.” 162  While many state courts adopt this “minimum 
rationality” test for due process challenges under state 
constitutions, some states have less deferential substantive due 
process tests.163  For instance, some state courts require that 
zoning ordinances have a “real and substantial relationship” to 
a legitimate purpose, invalidating zoning prohibitions that are 
only “tangentially related to public welfare, unduly oppressive, 
fundamentally unfair, or over- and under-inclusive in their 
impact.” 164   Other states have required that a zoning law’s 
prohibitions be “reasonably tailored to the objects to be obtained 
and not overly burdensome or excessive.”165 
The logic of a “zoning out” prohibition likely satisfies the 
“minimum rationality” test:  the ordinance mitigates climate 
change by disrupting the fossil fuel transportation system and 
raising the transportation costs and market price of fossil fuels, 
 
160 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928). 
161 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 128, at § 3.14. 
162 Id. at § 3:17. 
163 Id. at § 3:18. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at § 3:19. 
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thus reducing their consumption and GHG emissions.  However, 
a more difficult question is whether the ordinance would meet 
the more demanding due process requirements of states which 
require prohibitions to be not overly burdensome or overly 
inclusive, or more than somewhat related to the public welfare. 
Courts answering these questions can look to case law 
resolving questions of climate change causation for guidance.  
Causation is a standard embedded in Article III standing 
doctrine that requires a defendant’s conduct to be “fairly 
traceable” to a plaintiff’s injury.  This standard can be 
informative to courts evaluating whether a prohibition of certain 
land use activities furthers the ordinance’s objective because it 
parallels the due process standards by focusing on the extent to 
which an undesirable consequence can be attributed to a 
targeted action—in causation doctrine, the defendant’s action, 
and in the zoning context, the land user’s action.  For example, 
when a zoning prohibition is aimed at a land use analogous to a 
land use or behavior that is “fairly traceable” to a climate change 
injury (as identified in the standing doctrine), one can more 
confidently assume that there is rational basis for the zoning 
prohibition on such land use.  These causation analogies, 
however, are not without limitations, and so courts should be 
mindful of the relative advantages of the judiciary and 
legislature in determining which prohibitions meaningfully 
contribute to climate change mitigation. 
The Supreme Court, in its seminal climate change standing 
case Massachusetts, held that EPA’s lack of regulation of vehicle 
emissions was “fairly traceable” to Massachusetts’s climate 
change injury.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court first 
recognized that causal connection between GHGs emissions and 
climate change.166  The Court then rejected the premise that “a 
small incremental step [towards climate change mitigation]” 
could not be considered a step to solve the problem “because it 
was incremental.”167  This suggestion by the Supreme Court, 
that policy actions targeting GHG emissions, even if only 
incremental, can be direct and essential steps to solving the 
climate change problem supports the notion that a 
 
166 Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007). 
167 Id. at 524. 
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municipality’s zoning prohibitions on fossil fuel infrastructure 
can be meaningful, direct measures of climate change 
mitigation. 
Yet Massachusetts focused on domestic motor vehicle 
emissions, a swath of emissions much broader than those 
eliminated by a “zoning out” ordinance.  Therefore, a challenger 
may attack the relation of a “zoning out” prohibition to 
meaningful climate change mitigation with similar reasoning as 
the Ninth Circuit in Washington Environmental Council v. 
Bellon.  In Bellon, an environmental organization sued 
environmental regulators alleging that they failed to enforce, 
create, and apply GHG control standards on oil refineries.168  
The Bellon court distinguished Massachusetts, finding that 
while domestic motor vehicle were “meaningful contributions” to 
global GHG concentrations, the oil refineries’ GHG 
contributions (5.9% of Washington State’s GHG emissions) were 
not shown to be “meaningful contributions” to global GHG 
levels.169  Taking notice of this volume of GHG emissions, and 
“the numerous independent sources of GHG emissions,” the 
Court found no meaningful nexus between the Washington 
emissions and global GHG concentration.170  Courts, however, 
should remain mindful of the limits of Bellon’s analysis, and 
indeed their own ability to assess whether a zoning prohibition 
would meaningfully contribute to, and is thus substantially 
related to, its stated purpose to mitigate climate change. 
With these limitations in mind, even under the stricter 
“substantial relation” test, courts should often exercise 
deference to elected, local legislatures and uphold “zoning out” 
ordinances.  First, Bellon shows that answering the question of 
whether certain GHG emissions substantially contribute to 
climate change requires subjective, if not completely arbitrary, 
line drawing that cannot be guided by objective, judicially 
manageable standards.  It follows that drawing a line, in the 
course of a “substantial relation” analysis, that divides measures 
that meaningfully mitigate climate change from those that do 
not would leave litigants with arbitrary results. 
 
168 Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013). 
169 Id. at 1145–46. 
170 Id. at 1143–44. 
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This problem of arbitrariness is only exacerbated by the 
difficulty, recognized by several courts, in empirically 
demonstrating the precise effect certain local actions would or 
would not have on mitigating local climate change risk. 171  
Courts have also suggested there is a lack of accepted standards 
and methodologies that parties can use to show the impacts of 
local climate change mitigation efforts. 172   Thus, local 
communities face a challenge of employing acceptable, useful 
methodologies to develop a factual record from which a judge 
would decide whether a “zoning out” ordinance is sufficiently 
effective in reducing the local risks wrought by climate 
change.173  These empirical uncertainties only further highlight 
the institutional difficulties that the judiciary would face, as 
compared to the legislature, in determining the extent to which 
the prohibitions mitigate climate change, and thus bolsters the 
case for courts to exercise deference.  Indeed, several courts and 
commentators have recognized that climate change is very 
difficult for judicial organs to deal with.174  Climate change is, as 
Donald Gifford suggests, a “harm that our constitutional 
structures anticipated the political branches would handle,” 
and, deciding whether prohibitions meaningfully contribute to 
climate change mitigation “requires a policy decision of the type 
 
171 See Wildearth Guardians v. Salazar, 880 F. Supp. 2d 77, 85 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Plaintiffs 
point to studies suggesting that GHG emissions may lead to global or even broad regional 
climate change impacts, . . . but those studies do not establish a nexus between the 
anticipated GHG emissions . . . and ‘injuries alleged in the specific geographic area[s] of 
concern’”); Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1143 (“[T]he effect of this emission on global climate 
change is ‘scientifically indiscernible,’ given the emissions levels, the dispersal of GHGs 
world-wide, and ‘the absence of any meaningful nexus between Washington refinery 
emissions and global GHG concentration’”). 
172 See Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto, 208 Cal. App. 4th 899, 
941 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“The City did not decline to gauge the project’s cumulative 
impact on greenhouse gases and global climate change merely because there was no 
single, universally accepted methodology for gauging the impact.”) (emphasis added). 
173 See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Climate Change and the Individual, 66 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 345, 361 (2018) (arguing that “proof faced by climate change plaintiffs are often due 
to ‘gaps or uncertainties in relevant climate science, in part because scientific studies 
have focused on large-scale effects, rather than more local impact.”) (quoting Jacqueline 
Peel, Issues in Climate Change Litigation, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 15, 19 (2011)). 
174 Id. at 357–58 (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 n.6, 
272, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) as noting that “climate change was ‘patently political’ and 
‘transcendently legislative,’” “requiring a legislative policy determination before it could 
decide the global warming complaints.”). 
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appropriate for political institutions deriving their legitimacy 
from something other than a court’s reasoned elaboration from 
precedents that bear little or no resemblance to the problems at 
hand.”175 
Further, this kind of judicial deference gives appropriate life 
to the principle from Massachusetts and Taylor that a regulation 
aimed at mitigating an environmental risk is justifiable even if 
the regulation’s mitigation effort is “incremental” or the risk 
proves “negligible.”176  Application of this principle would allow 
a court, recognizing the harm a city suffers from climate change, 
to enable the city to defend itself, however negligibly, against the 
threat of climate change.  Indeed, courts should be wary of 
leaving a municipality unable to leverage its own land use 
powers to self-protect against climate change, especially when 
other actors have failed to do so.  This reasonable insulation of 
local legislative judgement with respect to measures that will 
reduce climate change risk, although to an unknown degree, 
represents a sound application of the “precautionary principle,” 
permitting “decisionmakers to avoid or minimize risks[,] whose 
consequence are uncertain and potentially serious[,] by taking 
anticipatory action.”177 
Ultimately, in light of the generally accommodating standard 
of review, and given the logic of Massachusetts, the potential 
arbitrariness of judicial second-guessing, and the more befitting 
role of the legislature to address the issue, it is likely 
appropriate, in most cases, for courts to afford deference to local 
legislators on the question of whether a “zoning out” ordinance 
is “substantially related” to climate change mitigation. 
 
175 Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating 
Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. L. REV. 201, 255 (2010) (cited in Grossman, supra 
note 173 at 352). 
176  See Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) 
(acknowledging that Massachusetts could be injured by the lack of regulatory action that 
takes “a small incremental step” in the face of a global problem and stating “[a] reform 
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems 
most acute to the legislative mind.” (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 
U.S. 483, 489)); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148 (state “had a legitimate interest in guarding 
against imperfectly understood environmental risk, despite the possibility that they may 
ultimately prove to be negligible”). 
177  Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the Precautionary Principle?  An American 
Assessment from an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 581 (2006). 
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Municipalities passing “zoning out” ordinances need also be 
aware of the implications of the Constitution’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause, another ground on which their ordinances 
are likely to be challenged.  Both the South Portland and 
Portland ordinances were challenged on Dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds, with the courts resolving the issue in favor of 
the cities.178  The following section lays out the requirements of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause in relation to the particularities 
of a “zoning out” ordinance that may make it vulnerable to such 
a challenge. 
1. Purposes and General Framework of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
The Dormant Commerce Clause describes the Constitution’s 
limitations on the power of individual states to regulate 
interstate commerce.  These limitations are implied from the 
Commerce Clause which states that Congress shall have the 
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several states, and with Indian Tribes.”179  The Commerce 
Clause, though written as a grant of power, carries a “negative 
implication” 180  that prohibits the states from enacting 
“regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”181  The doctrine 
“helps to ‘effectuate[] the Framers’ purpose to ‘prevent a State 
from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the 
welfare of the Nation as a whole.’”182  The Dormant Commerce 
Clause is applied to local laws, as well as state laws.183  The 
Dormant Commerce Clause, however, still leaves room for local 
regulation, even of issues that could be regulated at the federal 
level.184  In fact, courts should be “particularly hesitant” to strike 
 
178 Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 296-313 (D. Me. 
2018); Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 263-67 (Or. 
Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018). 
179 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
180 Dep’t of Rev. of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337 (2008). 
181 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988). 
182 Byrd v. Tenn. Wine and Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 883 F.3d 608, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2018). 
183 See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
184 City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
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down local policy under the commerce clause when localities are 
pursuing “typical[] and traditional[] . . . local government 
function[s].”185 
The primary justification for the dormant Commerce Clause is 
economic.  The doctrine is illustrative of the principle that the 
“economic unit is the nation,” 186 and guards against “economic 
balkanization” 187  and “economic protectionism” 188  among the 
states that arises from self-interest.  However, observers have 
recognized another rationale, less explicitly stated by courts:  the 
protection of powerless out-of-state interests. 189   These 
commentators extrapolate this rationale from Supreme Court 
opinions that justify upholding state statutes on grounds that 
they do not burden out-of-state interests that are unrepresented 
in the states’ political processes.190 
2. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Not Regulate 
Extraterritorially 
One requirement of the Dormant Commerce Clause is that 
state and local statutes do not regulate beyond the respective 
state’s lines.  The “Commerce Clause . . . precludes the 
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place 
wholly outside of the State’s borders.” 191   Extraterritorial 
regulation is impermissible regardless of legislative intent:  
“[t]he critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the 
regulation is to control conduct” outside the state. 192   “[T]he 
 
185 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 344 (2007) (cited in Brief for Defendant, Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City 
of Portland, No. A165618, 2017 WL 7362868 (Sept. 20, 2017)). 
186 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949). 
187 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
188 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988). 
189 Jennifer L. Larsen, Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 
844, 849 (2004). 
190 Id. (citing, among other cases, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 
383, 426 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).  See also John M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-
Steenberg, “Drawn from Local Knowledge . . . And Conformed to Local Wants”:  Zoning 
and Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 
25 (2006). 
191 Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)). 
192 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). 
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practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by 
considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by 
considering how the challenged statute may interact with the 
legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect 
would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar 
legislation.”193  Because a “zoning out” ordinance draws zoning 
lines wholly within the jurisdiction, and has only incidental 
effects on commerce outside these boundaries, it should survive 
extraterritoriality challenges. 
The Maine District Court resolved the extraterritorial 
challenge issue in favor of South Portland.  The District Court 
reasoned that “[c]onduct is not controlled . . . if it occurs outside” 
Maine.194   It considered the ordinance no different than any 
“local prohibition on particular goods or services [that] has the 
effect of preventing distant merchants from employing their 
capital and labor to sell those goods or services within the 
boundaries of the restrictive locality,” and worried that if these 
kinds of zoning prohibitions were found to have extraterritorial 
effect, there would be “no room for local historic police 
powers.”195  However, the court cited no case law supporting its 
reasoning except for the general principles of extraterritorial 
doctrine and the proposition that the Supreme Court had struck 
down only “price control, price affirmation, or price tying 
schemes” under the extraterritoriality doctrine.196 
Yet, the case law suggests that targets of extraterritorial 
challenges extend beyond price control laws.197  For example, in 
the Eighth Circuit case North Dakota v. Heydinger, North 
Dakota and out-of-state electric companies brought a challenge 
against Minnesota’s Next Generation Act, which prohibited 
anyone from importing to Minnesota “power from a new large 
 
193 Id. 




197  The Supreme Court has struck down an Illinois statute requiring out-of-state 
corporations to disclose materials to out-of-state target companies, and circuit courts 
have struck down non-price regulating statutes that sought to impose extraterritorial 
requirements on organizations conducting interstate commerce.  See Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 
1993); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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energy facility that would contribute to . . . power sector carbon 
dioxide emissions.” 198   The statute regulated “emissions of 
carbon dioxide from the generation of electricity imported from 
outside of the State and consumed in Minnesota.”199  The Eighth 
Circuit found that out-of-state power companies could only avoid 
offending the Minnesota statute, even when transacting 
completely out-of-state transactions, by “unplug[ging] from [a 
multi-state power grid]” or seeking regulatory approval in 
Minnesota. 200   The court therefore held that the statute 
regulated extraterritorially by having the “practical effect of 
[controlling] activities wholly outside of Minnesota.”201 
The Ninth Circuit, in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 
similarly addressed a state statute seeking to shape out-of-state 
behavior of energy producers.  In that case, fuel industry 
plaintiffs challenged a California regulation that sought to 
impose GHG emission standard on fuel consumed in 
California. 202   California evaluated a fuel’s compliance with 
GHG emission standards based on a “life-cycle analysis,” which 
accounted for emissions resulting from the production of the fuel 
ultimately imported into California, even if the production took 
place out of state.203  Upholding the California fuel standards, 
the Ninth Circuit found the standards to regulate only the 
California market.204  It reasoned that out-of-state firms could 
freely choose whether they wanted to comply with the California 
standards in order to gain market share there, and California 
may have incentivized compliance, but out-of-state companies 
were not required to meet any particular carbon standards nor 
were any jurisdictions forced to adopt any regulations in order 
for its producers to gain market share in California.205 
In light of the case law’s treatment of state regulations that 
seek to shape out-of-state behavior of energy companies, a 
 
198 Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 913–14. 
199 Id. at 916 (emphasis added). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 922. 
202 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2013). 
203 Id. at 1080–82. 
204 Id. at 1102–05. 
205 Id. at 1101, 1103 (citing Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 
(2003)). 
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“zoning out” ordinance should survive an extraterritorial 
challenge.  First, like the ordinance upheld by the Maine District 
Court, these zoning prohibitions are likely to be narrow as they 
will only prohibit operations within their jurisdictions.  Unlike 
in Heydinger, where the statute at issue would have effectively 
prevented out-of-state companies from participating in out-of-
state markets,206 such zoning prohibitions will not preclude an 
energy company from operating in another a jurisdiction outside 
the municipality where the ordinance operates.  Fossil fuel 
operations originating out-of-state will still have the 
opportunity, when possible, to re-route their operations to avoid 
the zoning prohibitions. 
However, these ordinances may have a more difficult time 
surviving an extraterritorial challenge if they have the effect of 
requiring a fossil fuel operation to shut down completely, such 
as the South Portland ordinance likely has. 207   This kind of 
extraterritorial effect would go beyond those of the statute in 
Rocky Mountain which influenced out-of-state choices,208  and 
resemble more closely the Heydinger facts because such an 
ordinance would leave the affected business with no choice but 
to shut down.  Yet, even these kinds of ordinances are likely to 
survive, because as noted by the Maine District Court, these 
ordinances merely draw lines determining the extent of 
operations taking place wholly within their geographic spheres 
of influence.209 
Although the primary purpose of a “zoning out” ordinance is 
climate change mitigation—an effort whose effects extend 
“extraterritorially”—the extended “reach” of this purpose would 
not affect an ordinance’s ability to survive an extraterritorial 
challenge.  As the Maine District Court stated, the purpose of 
the local law is irrelevant because “the ‘critical inquiry’ . . . is 
‘whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control 
conduct’” outside the state.210 
 
206 Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 921–22. 
207 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 284, 309 (D. Me. 2018). 
208 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1101. 
209 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. at 297. 
210 Id. at 298 (quoting Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 69 (1st Cir. 
1999)) (emphasis added)). 
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Although never resolved by the court, a reasonable 
extraterritoriality challenge was brought by the Oakland 
plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs cited numerous cases to support an 
argument that activity which makes interstate transportation of 
fossil fuels more difficult is a regulation of interstate 
commerce.211   However, the cases they relied upon generally 
dealt with laws invalidated because they sought to directly 
prohibit, or in some case burden, transportation of certain items, 
into or out of a jurisdiction, through direct regulation of 
transportation infrastructure and vehicles that cross state 
borders.  By contrast, a “zoning out” ordinance can achieve its 
full purpose by prohibiting only stationary fossil fuel operations 
within a jurisdiction.  This prohibition may make fossil fuel 
transportation into the jurisdiction futile or interstate 
transportation costlier, but it is not likely to be found to directly 
and impermissibly regulate transportation infrastructure or 
vehicles moving into, out of, or around the jurisdiction. 
3. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Not Discriminate 
The Dormant Commerce Clause also prohibits state and local 
statutes that discriminate against out-of-state commerce on 
their face, in effect, or in purpose.212  Discrimination “simply 
means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the 
 
211 Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 
LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  The plaintiff cited the 
following cases:  Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (invalidating statute 
that required oil companies in West Virginia to fulfill needs of in-state consumers before 
transporting oil out-of-state to out-of-state consumers); West v. Kan. Nat. Gas, 221 U.S. 
229 (1911) (invalidating statute that prohibited in-state oil from using pipelines to 
transport oil out of state); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) 
(invalidating statute prohibiting common carriers from transporting liquor into the 
state, distinguishing this effect from a right “arise[ing] only after the act of 
transportation has terminated”); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania 171 U.S. 1 (1898) 
(invalidating statute that prohibits importation of oleomargine into the state and in-
state sales of the “healthful” commodity); Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., v. Husen, 95 
U.S. 465 (1877) (invalidating state statute that prohibited the transportation of cattle 
into or through the state, even if the cattle were not unloaded in state); Minnesota Rate 
Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) (invalidating Minnesota law that required railways to charge 
favorable rates to in-state commerce). 
212 See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6 (1992). 
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latter.”213  The legislature need not intend for the statute to be 
discriminatory for it to be struck down:  a statute is invalid if it 
has “the ‘practical effect’ of discriminating [against interstate 
commerce] in its operation.” 214   If the law is found to be 
discriminatory, it is invalid per se and will “survive only if it 
‘advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately 
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’”215 
i. Facial Discrimination 
There is no apparent reason why a “zoning out” ordinance 
needs to be drafted to facially discriminate against out-of-state 
fossil fuel companies.  Therefore, these ordinances will not be 
struck down on facial discrimination grounds. 
ii. Practical Discrimination 
A more likely challenge to these “zoning out” ordinances would 
involve whether they would discriminate against interstate 
commerce in practice or effect.  However, because “zoning out” 
ordinances would treat out-of-state companies the same as in-
state companies, they would not likely be found to discriminate 
in effect unless they disproportionately favored in-state 
consumers.  In fact, the Maine District Court and the Oregon 
Court of Appeals resolved the “practical discrimination” 
challenges there in favor of the cities.216 
The most important fact to both courts was the ordinances 
regulated even-handedly with respect to in-state and out-of-
state fossil fuel companies, barring both from expanding 
operations. 217   The courts focused on the Supreme Court’s 
language in General Motors Corp. v. Tracy that “any notion of 
discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar 
 
213 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338 (2007). 
214  Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 136 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part). 
215 Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008). 
216 Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 300 (D. Me. 
2018); Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 263–66 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2018). 
217 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 300–01; Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades 
Council, 412 P.3d at 263–65. 
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entities.” 218   Both courts recognized that even if there were 
competition between out-of-state and in-state companies, both 
would be equally affected. 219   Because any “zoning out” 
ordinance would have the effect of diminishing opportunities for 
in-state, out-of-state, and foreign companies alike, it is unlikely 
that courts would find discriminatory effect.  Indeed, as noted by 
the Maine court, the Supreme Court has stated that just because 
an ordinance harms only interstate companies does not 
necessarily “lead . . . to a conclusion that the State is 
discriminating against interstate commerce.”220 
The Third Circuit resolved a case that would be very factually 
similar to a “practical” discrimination challenge to a “zoning out” 
ordinance.  In Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, the Court 
upheld a Delaware statute that banned “bulk transfer facilities,” 
used for loading coal onto marine tankers, from the state’s 
coastal areas.221  The court upheld the statute, finding that it 
had no discriminatory effect.222   The Court reasoned that “a 
state’s choice between competing land use . . . does not implicate 
the Commerce Clause simply because the alternative may be in 
the best economic interest of the state so long as the state’s 
choice does not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state 
competitors.”223  However, before making this conclusion, the 
court stated it “believe[d] the ‘discriminatory effect’ cases are 
best regarded as cases of purposeful discrimination,”224 making 
a step that  scholars suggest the Supreme Court appears to 
reject.225  Although the holding of Oberly may improperly burden 
a challenge on the basis of the discriminatory effects test, its 
holding still supports the idea that a ban on bulk handling of 
fossil fuels, a feature of a “zoning out” ordinance, is not 
discriminatory, even if it prioritizes the policies of the 
 
218 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 300 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 
519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997)); Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council, 412 P.3d at 263–64. 
219 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 300–03; Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades 
Council, 412 P.3d at 263–65. 
220 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 303 (citing Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 125). 
221 Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 1987). 
222 Id. at 400–03. 
223 Id. at 402. 
224 Id. at 400. 
225 Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 190, at 15–16.  See also Chem. Waste Mgmt., 
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6 (2009). 
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municipality (e.g. climate change mitigation), as compared to the 
interests of out-of-state actors. 
However, to the extent a “zoning out” ordinance limits 
expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure in a way that 
disproportionately affects out-of-state consumers, it may prove 
discriminatory.  The Oregon plaintiffs raised the persuasive 
argument that because the Portland ordinance was designed to 
protect the existing supply of fossil fuels to Oregon, but disallow 
expansions that would make the terminals capable of supplying 
out-of-state consumers, the ordinance discriminated against out-
of-state consumers as compared to in-state consumers.226  The 
principal case cited by the court in response was Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, which involved 
a challenge to a Maine law that taxed more heavily those 
campsites which served more out-of-state customers as 
compared to campsites that served more in-state customers.227  
Finding the Maine legislation unlawful, the Supreme Court 
explained that “[e]conomic protectionism is not limited to convey 
advantages on local merchants; it may include attempts to give 
local consumers an advantage over consumers in other 
states.”228 
In response to the plaintiff’s consumer protection argument, 
the Oregon court simply stated the ordinance did not “favor 
Oregon consumers when compared to out-of-state consumers,” 
and did not regulate the conduct of out-of-state consumers.229  
While the Court was right to conclude that the ordinance did not 
regulate the conduct of out-of-state consumers, it is far from 
obvious that the ordinance does not favor Oregon consumers.  A 
court could reasonably find favoritism on the basis of the 
ordinance protecting in-state vis-à-vis out-of-state supply. 230  
Even more, the Oregon zoning ordinance, which makes the city 
unavailable for the expansion of out-of-state fossil fuel transport 
 
226 Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 265 (Or. Ct. App. 
2018).  
227 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 567–69 (1997) 
(quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 
(1986)). 
228 Id. at 577–78. 
229 Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council, 412 P.3d at 266. 
230 Id. at 262–63. 
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infrastructure, may have an upward effect on future transport 
costs for fossil fuels being consumed out of state that could be 
passed on to out-of-state consumers.  By contrast, because the 
Oregon ordinance protects existing infrastructure that services 
most of Oregon’s fossil fuel demand,231 it may have no effect on 
transportation costs of fossil fuels consumed in state, and in-
state consumers may suffer no such passed on costs.  Therefore, 
to the extent a “zoning out” ordinance, like the Oregon 
ordinance, preserves fossil fuel infrastructure sufficient to meet 
its own citizens’ needs, a court may strike it down, finding 
economic favoritism of in-state consumers under the logic of 
Camps Newfound and the Oregon plaintiff’s arguments.  Indeed, 
a municipality can avoid such a challenge altogether by banning 
fossil fuel infrastructure outright, though this is very likely a 
step municipalities are not yet practically ready to take. 
iii. In Purpose 
A “zoning out” ordinance will also be struck down if its 
purpose, determined by “the plain meaning of the statute’s 
words, [and] enlightened by their context and the 
contemporaneous legislative history,” 232  is discriminatory.  
Because a “zoning out” ordinance’s primary purpose is to 
mitigate climate change and it intends to treat all fossil fuels the 
same, it would likely not be found to have a discriminatory 
purpose. 
A court would need to evaluate the primary purpose of a 
“zoning out” ordinance.  The Portland, Maine plaintiffs alleged 
that public comments surrounding the ordinance legislation, as 
well as the ordinance’s preclusion of import from Canada, 
showed the ordinance was intended to discriminate against 
Canadian commerce.233  The Court dismissed these claims by 
first finding that the primary purpose of the law, reflected in 
both public comment and legislative history, was to protect local 
 
231 Id.  
232 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).  See also Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. 
City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 303 (D. Me. 2018) (citing All. of Auto. Mfrs. 
v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 37–39 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
233 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 3d at 303–05. 
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health, rather than burden foreign commerce.234  A court looking 
at a “zoning out” ordinance should be able to easily conclude the 
primary purpose is to mitigate climate change, rather than 
burden international commerce. 
Additionally, both the Maine and Oregon courts recognized 
that the ordinances at issue presented facts similar to those in 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, in that they had the purpose of 
limiting the access of out-of-state goods to their jurisdiction.235  
The courts, however, distinguished Philadelphia because the 
statute at issue in that case specifically precluded the entry of 
out-of-state waste on the basis of its out-of-state origin.236  The 
relevant zoning ordinances in Maine and Oregon would treat the 
handling of any fossil fuel, regardless of its point of origin, 
identically. 237   A “zoning out” ordinance would not have the 
purpose of discriminatorily burdening interstate commerce, 
being similarly agnostic to the state of origin of the fossil fuels. 
Even if a challenger could show that the ordinance intended to 
harm interstate and international fossil fuel commerce, a point 
the Maine District Court found was not at issue, 238  a court 
should still not strike down the ordinance.  Such a purpose could 
be reasonably implied from the findings underlying the Oakland 
ordinance, which suggested the ordinance was designed to limit 
exports “lead[ing] to the burning of coal overseas.”239  But again 
there would be no discriminatory purpose because 
discrimination analysis compares “substantially similar 
entities” and a “zoning out” ordinance would have the purpose of 
treating the fossil fuels produced and distributed by fossil fuel 
companies, regardless of their point of origin, the same.  
However, as suggested above, a challenger could still argue that 
a “zoning out” ordinance has the purpose of favoring in-state 
consumers. 
 
234 Id. at 305. 
235 Id. at 305–07; Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council, 412 P.3d at 265. 
236 Portland Pipe Line, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council, 412 
P.3d at 265. 
237 Portland Pipe Line, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 306; Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council, 412 
P.3d at 265. 
238 Portland Pipe Line, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 298–99, 303–04. 
239 OAKLAND, CAL, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8.60.020 (2019). 
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4. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Satisfy the Pike Test 
The Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. test will likely be the Dormant 
Commerce Clause test that challengers to a “zoning out” 
ordinance most heavily rely upon.  Under the Pike balancing 
test, a non-discriminatory statute having incidental effects on 
interstate commerce will be upheld “unless the burden imposed 
on such [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.”240  The local purpose must be found 
to be “legitimate,” and the extent that the burden on interstate 
commerce will be tolerated “depend[s] on the nature of the local 
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well 
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”241  Because climate 
change mitigation is likely a legitimate purpose within the 
purview of local governments, and environmental regulations 
are given solicitude in a Pike analysis, a “zoning out” ordinance 
should likely pass the Pike test. 
An application of the Pike test to a “zoning out” ordinance 
would begin with an analysis of whether the ordinance’s purpose 
(i.e., climate change mitigation) is a legitimate local purpose.  
Although not at issue in Maine, the Oregon Court had the 
opportunity to consider whether the climate change purpose of 
the ordinance was a legitimate local purpose but declined to do 
so, instead focusing on the other more traditional safety 
purposes of the ordinance it found legitimate. 242   However, 
multiple judges have addressed this question almost directly. 
As noted above, in Rocky Mountain, the District Court of the 
Eastern District of California found that although the statute at 
issue discriminated against interstate commerce in practice, it 
served a legitimate local purpose of mitigating climate change.243  
A concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit agreed with this 
holding, citing Massachusetts v. EPA and Maine v. Taylor for the 
proposition that states have a legitimate interest in protecting 
 
240 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
241 Id. 
242 Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 266–67, 267 n.7 
(Or. Ct. App. 2018).  
243 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234, 2011 WL 6936368, 
at *15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011).  
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themselves against environmental risks.244  The Ninth Circuit 
also recognized climate change mitigation as a legitimate local 
purpose in a subsequent Rocky Mountain opinion, finding that 
California was justified in “attempt[ing] to address a vitally 
important environmental issue with vast potential 
consequences.” 245   The Ninth Circuit cited American Fuel v. 
O’Keefe, a Ninth Circuit case, which stated that “[i]t is well 
settled that [] states have a legitimate interest in combating the 
adverse effects of climate change on their residents.”246 
However, in a dissenting opinion from the decision to deny a 
rehearing en banc for the first Rocky Mountain case, six judges 
signaled their uneasiness with the notion that mitigating 
climate change could be considered a legitimate local purpose in 
the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause.247  It stated that 
mitigating climate change was not a “legitimate local concern” 
because a local “scheme” would “have little to no effect in 
averting the environmental catastrophe envisioned by the 
majority.”248  The dissenting judges employed similar reasoning 
as the Supreme Court in Kassel v. Consolidated Freighways 
Corp. of Delaware, which suggested that if the stated local 
purposes are “illusory,” they are not legitimate local purposes.249  
The Kassel majority found that a state statute, purported to 
promote automobile safety, did not actually promote safety.250  
Thus, the statute’s rationale was merely “illusory” and its 
significant burdens on interstate commerce were unjustified.251  
If a court considered the effect of a “zoning out” ordinance on 
climate change to be de minimis, a court may strike the statute 
down because its underlying rationale about safety and health 
considerations is “illusory.” 
 
244  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Murguia, J., concurring in part) (citing Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516–21 (2007)). 
245 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 913 F.3d 940, 955 (9th Cir. 2019). 
246 Id. (citing Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 913 (9th Cir. 
2018)). 
247 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, 
J., dissenting). 
248 Id. 
249 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
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Although the Ninth Circuit majority opinions may provide 
persuasive authority, whether other courts consider climate 
change a legitimate local purpose will likely depend on how far 
a court is willing to extend the holding of Massachusetts v. EPA.  
In many ways, this analysis mirrors the analyses, discussed 
above, of whether climate change should be considered a local 
problem in the context of zoning law, and whether zoning 
prohibitions on fossil fuel infrastructure are substantially 
related to climate change mitigation.  Ultimately, in line with 
the Ninth Circuit, and for the same reasons that courts should 
likely exercise deference to a legislature’s finding that its zoning 
prohibitions were substantially related to climate change 
mitigation,252 a court should exercise deference to a legislature 
identifying climate change as a legitimate local purpose.  Indeed, 
given coastal municipalities unique vulnerability to climate 
change, courts may be willing to find that climate change 
mitigation in these municipalities is a legitimate local purpose. 
The local benefits of a “zoning out” ordinance may also exceed 
its effects on interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test.  
At least one commentator suggests that an environmental 
purpose can hold substantial weight in this balancing test.253  
Erin Tanimura suggests Pacific Merchant II is an 
environmental example of a Ninth Circuit trend to uphold 
“highly contentious regulations to promote significant public 
interests.”254  Pacific Merchant II dealt with a California law 
that imposed fuel standards on ships reaching its ports.255  The 
court found the law’s local benefit of protecting its citizens from 
air pollution outweighed the burdens on commerce. 256  
Tanimura notes that the court’s Pike analysis primarily focused 
on the environmental policy and its effects, making little 
substantive analysis of the burdens on commerce.257 
 
252 See supra Section III(A)(5). 
253 Erin Tanimura, Pacific Merchant II’s Dormant Commerce Clause Ruling:  Expanding 
State Control Over Commerce through Environmental Regulations, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
419, 439–40 (2013). 
254 Id. 
255 Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2011). 
256 Id. at 1158. 
257 Tanimura, supra note 254, at 435. 
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The Portland Pipe Line Corp. opinion’s Pike analysis followed 
a path similar as the Pike analysis in Pacific Merchant II.  The 
court found that the City had several legitimate concerns 
motivating the ordinance, including air quality, odor, noise, and 
aesthetic impacts.258  While the court did address the potential 
burdens on interstate commerce, which were not insubstantial—
financial losses to shareholders, workers, and others—the 
court’s analysis focused mostly on the evidence of the purported 
local benefits. 259   The court reviewed testimony of the city’s 
health expert, submissions of the American Lung Association, 
and the potential impacts on the city’s developments plan.260  
Ultimately, the court, quoting Kassel, suggested it should not be 
in the business of “second-guess[ing]” the safety judgements of 
the city legislature.261 
The Oregon court conducted the Pike test similarly.  The court 
stressed the ordinance’s local benefits like reducing earthquake-
associated risks and air pollution.262  It even went further than 
the Portland Pipe Line Corp. and Pacific Merchant II courts by 
refusing to consider the burdens on interstate commerce, 
suggesting the plaintiffs had the burden to develop a record 
showing the effects on interstate commerce and failed to do so.263 
Because courts appear to afford environmental regulations 
appreciable deference under the Pike analysis, as suggested by 
Tanimura and the Maine and Oregon decisions, a court may find 
the benefits of a “zoning out” ordinance to outweigh its 
prospective burdens on interstate commerce.  Further, a “zoning 
out” ordinance has a clear safety purpose and courts are 
instructed to refrain from “second-guess[ing] legislative 
judgement about [the safety justification’s] importance in 
comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce.”264 
 
258 Portland Pipe Line, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 310. 
259 Id. at 309–13. 
260 Id. at 310–13. 
261 Id. at 313. 
262 Colum. Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 266 (Or. Ct. App. 
2018). 
263 Id. at 267.  It is interesting to note, however, that the opinion cites no Supreme Court 
precedent that the burden to develop such a burden falls on the challengers to the law 
at question. 
264 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981). 
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It is true however, as others note, that the balancing test is 
unpredictable 265  as it requires something like “legislative 
judgment.”266 
5. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Not Interfere with 
Foreign Affairs 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine also recognizes the “need 
for [federal] uniformity” in foreign commerce, because in “foreign 
intercourse and trade[,] the people of the United States act 
through a single government with unified and adequate national 
power.”267  Because a “zoning out” ordinance does not prevent 
the federal government from “‘speaking with one voice’ in 
regulating foreign commerce,”268 it should not be struck down on 
federal uniformity grounds. 
For similar reasons as those stated in the Maine decision, a 
“zoning out” ordinance would not likely face a successful 
challenge informed by the foreign affairs rationale of Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine.  First, like the Maine ordinance, a 
“zoning out” ordinance need not target any specific nation to 
achieve its purpose. 269   Additionally, as the Maine opinion 
explained, a “zoning out” ordinance or a patchwork of “zoning 
out” ordinances throughout the country, would not threaten the 
uniformity of federal policy towards interstate commerce, as it 
would merely limit the U.S. regions in which international fossil 
fuel companies could develop infrastructure.270 
C. Federal Preemption 
A final challenge a “zoning out” ordinance is likely to face is a 
charge that the ordinance is preempted by federal law.  The 
Supremacy Clause states that the “Constitution, and the Laws 
 
265 Will Sears, Note, Full-Impact Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 157, 166 (2014). 
266 Id. at 166 n.59; Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
267 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448–49 (1979) (quoting Bd. of Tr. of 
Univ. of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933). 
268 Id. at 451. 
269 Portland Pipe Line, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 314. 
270 Id. at 315. 
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the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”271  
Under this authority, a body of law has developed that 
recognizes that federal law trumps state and local law when it 
reaches the same subject matter that the state or local law 
regulates.  Because there is scant federal legislation targeting 
climate change or localized fossil fuel handling, federal 
preemption will not likely pose a formidable challenge to “zoning 
out” ordinances. 
1. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Not be Preempted by 
Federal Statute 
A state or local statute can be preempted by federal statute in 
three different ways, though “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone’ in every preemption case.’” 272   First, a 
federal statute will preempt a state statute when the federal 
statute expressly indicates, or implicitly indicates through its 
structure and purpose, that it alone is to regulate a subject that 
the state statute also regulates.273  When the statute indicates 
such preemptive intent, the Court must then determine “the 
substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law.”274  
Second, federal law preempts state law when it occupies the field 
in which the state law regulates, which occurs when the “scheme 
of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room to supplement it.” 275  
Finally, federal law preempts state law when “compliance with 
both the federal and state regulation is a physical 
impossibility.”276 
The Maine District Court fielded two statutory federal 
preemption claims.  The plaintiffs alleged that the local 
ordinance was preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act as well as 
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act.277   However, the court 
 
271 U.S. CONST., art. VI. 
272 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
273 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–26 (1977). 
274 Altria Group, 555 U.S. at 76. 
275 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
276 California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987). 
277 Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 321, 428, 434 (D. 
Me. 2017). 
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found that while the purpose and effect of the loading ordinance 
was to reduce air pollution and protect local aesthetic, the two 
federal laws in question related to pipeline safety with respect 
to issues like spills, and the safety of vessels moving through a 
harbor, respectively. 278   So, to the extent a “zoning out” 
ordinance would operate against an interstate pipeline, such 
operation of the law against the pipeline would not be on the 
basis of imposing safety regulations on the physical 
infrastructure and therefore the Pipeline Safety statute would 
not preempt it.  Given the Port and Waterways statute’s concern 
with marine travel in ports, a “zoning out” ordinance targeting 
on-land infrastructure not directly related to seagoing travel 
would not likely be preempted. 
The Oakland plaintiffs also raised a federal preemption attack 
on the Oakland ordinance, arguing that the ordinance was 
preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act and 
the Shipping Act.279  In the case of a “zoning out” ordinance, such 
an ordinance would not seem to be preempted by Hazardous 
Materials because the Act is concerned with “protect[ing] 
against the risks . . . inherent in transportation of hazardous 
materials. ”280  A narrowly drafted “zoning out” ordinance would 
need to target only stationary infrastructure, not 
transportation.281  “Zoning out” ordinances would also not likely 
be preempted by the Shipping Act because that Act prohibits 
“unreasonable” discrimination by marine terminal operators,282 
and parallel to the argument of the Oakland defendants,283 a 
“zoning out” ordinance, like the Oakland ordinance, is a law of 
general application justified by health and safety. 
 
278 Id. at 428–40. 
279 Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgement, Oakland Bulk & 
Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland at 27–29, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 20, 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-07014-VC) [hereinafter Oakland Plaintiff’s Brief]. 
280 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (2018) (emphasis added); Defendant’s Brief in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgement, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland 
at 33–36, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-07014-VC) 
[hereinafter Oakland Defendant’s Brief]. 
281 The Oakland defendants also argued that coal is not defined as a hazardous material 
under the HMTA, and thus to the extent that a prohibition effects the transportation of 
coal, the HMTA does not apply.  See Oakland Defendant’s Brief, supra note 280, at 33–
35. 
282 46 U.S.C. § 41106 (2018). 
283 See Oakland Defendant’s Brief, supra note 280, at 36. 
PERRON-MACRO-040820 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2020  2:11 PM 
2020] “Zoning Out” Climate Change 625 
 
Though a closer call, a “zoning out” ordinance is also unlikely 
to run afoul of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act (“ICCTA”).  Although unresolved by the court, 
the Oakland parties addressed whether Oakland’s zoning 
prohibition of coal handling at a terminal which would be served 
by rail, was preempted by the ICCTA.284  As a threshold matter, 
a plaintiff seeking to show that an ordinance is preempted by 
the ICCTA must show that the ordinance regulates 
transportation by rail carrier.285  However, the preemptive effect 
of the ICCTA extends broadly to “transportation by rail 
carriers,” remedies respecting “rates, classifications, rules, 
practices . . .,” and the “construction, acquisition, [or] 
operation . . . of . . . facilities.” 286   Courts have held that the 
“ICCTA ‘preempts all state laws that may reasonably be said to 
have the effect of managing or governing rail transportation, 
while permitting the continued application of laws having a 
more remote or incidental effect of transportation.’”287 
No “zoning out” ordinance need target transportation of fossil 
fuels by rail carrier, a subject preempted by the ICCTA.  When 
the ordinance seeks only to prohibit “handling” or “storage” of 
fossil fuels at facilities, it would seem merely an exercise of 
general police powers and not a regulation of transportation.  
Yet courts have recognized, as argued by the Oakland 
plaintiffs, 288  that operations of intermodal transloading 
“‘involving loading and unloading materials from rail 
cars’ . . . are part of transportation” 289  and that the Surface 
Transportation Board has found “facilities . . . part of the 
general system of rail transportation” to be “part of the 
interstate network.” 290   Still, as argued by the Oakland 
 
284 See Oakland Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 279, at 20–27. 
285 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a) (2018). 
286 Id. 
287 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 F.3d 1094, 1097–98 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (quoting N.Y. Susquehanna v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 2007).  See 
also Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, Regulation of Movement of Crude Oil by 
Rail in New York, 254 N.Y. L.J., no. 90 (Nov. 9, 2015). 
288 See Oakland Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 279, at 22–27. 
289 Grosso v. Surface Transp. Bd., 804 F.3d 110, 118 (1st Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). 
290 Or. Coast Scenic R.R., LLC v. Or. Dep’t. of State Lands, 841 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
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defendants, 291  “zoning out” challengers could not show that 
these targeted, “non-railroad” 292  operations became 
transportation by rail carrier simply because a rail carrier “uses 
rail cars to transport” fossil fuels to the operator of the fossil fuel 
terminal.293  Indeed, a “zoning out” ordinance would “not prevent 
anyone from running a rail operation or otherwise . . . attempt 
to regulate rail operations.”294  Thus, a “zoning out” ordinance 
which would operate upon fossil fuel infrastructure served by 
rail does not regulate a rail carrier and likely would not be 
preempted by the ICCTA.295 
2. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Not be Preempted by the 
Federal Maritime Powers 
Neither should a “zoning out” ordinance be preempted by 
Congress’s general power to regulate maritime matters under 
the Admiralty Clause.296  Because “zoning out” ordinances target 
on-shore infrastructure, they do not offend the precepts of South 
Pacific Co. v. Jensen by prejudicing “the characteristic features 
of maritime law or interfer[ing] with the proper harmony and 
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate 
relations.”297 
Focusing on the act of loading marine vessels in a harbor, the 
Maine plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was preempted by 
federal maritime powers. 298   The court rejected the claims, 
finding that the federal interest in uniformity in on-shore 
loading operations was weak while the local interests in 
 
291 See Oakland Defendant’s Brief, supra note 280, at 26–30. 
292 CFNR Operating Co. v. City of Am. Canyon, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 
2003). 
293 Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 309 (3d Cir. 2004). 
294 CNFR Operating Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. 
295 See also Matthew C. Donahue, Note, Federal Railroad Power Versus Local Land-Use 
Regulation:  Can Localities Stop Crude-By-Rail in its Tracks?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 146, 200–01 (2017) (stating that no courts have found ICCTA preemption “over 
a facility not owned or operated by a railroad”; and that although a facility will fall within 
its jurisdiction if operated by an agent “operating under the auspices of rail carrier,” that 
inquiry “focuses on the amount of liability and ownership responsibility a railroad truly 
intends to take on regarding the operation of the facility.”). 
296 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. 
297 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). 
298 Portland Pipe Line, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 445. 
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reducing air pollution was strong.299  Specifically, it could find 
no cases under Jensen that struck down ordinances targeting 
the loading or unloading of goods, or construction of on-shore 
facilities.300  Even in cases where targeted terminals interreact 
directly with sea-bound vessels, the federal maritime power is 
unlikely to preempt such local  “zoning out” ordinances because 
such ordinances are likely to focus generally on on-shore 
activities. 
3. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Not be Preempted by the 
Federal Foreign Affairs Power 
A “zoning out” ordinance is similarly unlikely to be preempted 
by the federal foreign affairs power.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that “an exercise of state power that touches on 
foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, 
given the ‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with 
foreign nations.’”301  The weight of the municipalities’ interest 
should be judged in relation to its law’s conflict with federal 
foreign policy to determine whether the law should be 
preempted.302 
The Maine District Court also resolved the foreign affairs 
preemption challenge against the pipeline operators.  The court 
found that the pipeline did not explicitly target any country, did 
not conflict with any consistent federal policy, and advanced a 
legitimate local goal. 303   However, a “zoning out” ordinance 
would be analyzed slightly differently.  Although it too would 
likely not need to explicitly target any country, a court would 
consider whether it conflicted with any consistent federal policy 
on climate change.  However, as noted above,304 there does not 
seem to be any consistent federal policy on climate change, only 
an absence of policy. 
 
299 Id. at 447–48. 
300 Id. at 447. 
301 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)). 
302 Id. at 420.  
303 Portland Pipe Line Corp., 288 F. Supp. 3d at 442–45. 
304 See supra Section I(B). 
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4. A “Zoning Out” Ordinance Must Not be Preempted by 
State Law 
Finally, each state will have its own doctrine of preemption 
law, and a different statutory scheme.  Thus, any local 
municipality seeking to pass an ordinance must further consider 
the extent to which it may be preempted by its own state’s 
statutory scheme.305 
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS 
A. Patchwork Preemption:  Should Congress Preempt “Zoning 
Out” Ordinances? 
The policy proposed hereinafter proceeds on the assumption 
that courts will uphold “zoning out” ordinances, and answers the 
question of whether, under these circumstances, Congress 
should pass federal legislation effectively preempting local 
municipalities by prohibiting them from passing such 
ordinances.  I argue that Congress should only step in to 
preempt such local ordinances if the number of cities prohibiting 
fossil fuel infrastructure grows so as to substantially burden 
fossil fuel companies’ ability to meet the fossil fuel demands of 
interstate markets. 
Given the history of land use as a traditional local power, local 
land use power should only be preempted by federal power in 
special circumstances.  Commentators and courts propound on 
the inherently local nature of zoning, with Justice Thurgood 
Marshall stating that “zoning ‘may indeed be the most essential 
function performed by local government, for it is one of the 
primary means by which we protect that sometimes difficult to 
define concept of quality of life.’” 306   Commentators further 
suggest that the “Supreme Court’s acceptance of otherwise 
constitutionally suspect conduct . . . when it is embodied in a 
zoning regulation” and the high deference to local legislatures 
 
305 See Victoria M. Scozzaro, Note, Home Rule Hope:  A Community Guide to Keeping 
Hydraulic Fracturing Off Local Property, 18 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 84 (2016) (discussing 
different state preemption regimes with respect to local oil and gas, particularly drilling, 
land use laws). 
306 Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 190, at 38–39 (quoting Vill. of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
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exercised by federal courts when evaluating Constitutional 
rights in zoning challenge indicates the importance of local land 
use even in the face of other nationally protected interests.307  
Given this inherently local characteristics of zoning, and its 
importance via-a-vis national interests, Congress should 
identify serious threats to national interests before preempting 
this power. 
Secondly, given the lack of federal policy on climate change, 
municipalities should retain the ability to innovate in this field.  
Such innovation can reduce the risks of global climate change 
and serve as an informative example for the federal government 
when it eventually formulates meaningful policy.  William 
Buzbee describes this kind of state reservation of climate change 
regulatory power as a “federalism hedge,” which protects against 
a federal regime that preempts state regulations but is too lax, 
poorly implemented, or eventually reversed. 308   He further 
argues that the mere possibility of such state regulations 
“creates incentives for greater commitment to the successful 
implementation of [climate focused] federal law.” 309  
Importantly, in addition to such practical function, “zoning out” 
ordinances serve an important symbolic function by allowing big 
and small cities, affected by climate change alike, to signal that 
they demand climate action and proactive federal policy.  These 
democratic exercises should be respected, not preempted.  
Congress should study these exercises as a model of a climate 
change policy and internalize them as the demands of citizens 
threatened by climate change. 
Finally, federal preemption should only arise in special 
circumstances because even if these “zoning out” measures are 
taken by a handful or several dozen municipalities, these 
ordinances would likely only make transportation of oil 
marginally more expensive for interstate and international 
consumers.  As noted by Alexandra B. Klass, the current 
domestic siting and regulation regime of oil transportation is 
such that even when transportation development projects meet 
state or local resistance, the flexibility of the regime allows for 
 
307 Id. at 40–41. 
308 Buzbee, supra note 22, at 1093–99. 
309 Id. at 1099. 
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the projects to move forward, though at a higher cost.310  So, even 
a number of coastal states passing such ordinances is not likely 
to have a drastic effect on the supply of oil in the country, 
although it would raise costs.  A marginal effect on price would 
surely not rise to the level of a threat to national interests that 
would justify Congressional action. 
However, to the extent “zoning out” ordinances are adopted by 
a large number of municipalities so as to substantially burden 
fossil fuel companies’ ability to meet the demand of the 
interstate markets, the federal government will need to pass 
legislation that manages the extent to which municipalities can 
pass such ordinances.  It is at this point that “zoning out” 
ordinances would risk meaningful economic inefficiencies, a 
target of the Commerce Clause, by “diverting business away 
from presumptively low-cost producers,” thus substantially 
burdening the whole country while advancing a local benefit 
that may not enjoy “approval from the point of view of the nation 
as a whole.” 311   Although I do not precisely define what a 
“substantial burden” on the interstate market would look like, it 
would incorporate some notion of national economic interest and 
security.  Any federal citing regime, preempting local “zoning 
out” ordinances should, however, promote citing efficiencies and, 
to the greatest extent possible, balance the promotion of efficient 
transportation markets and the interests of local 
governments.312 
 
310  Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas:  U.S. 
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1015–16, (2015). 
311 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1141 n.81 (1986) (cited by Baker & 
Konar-Steenberg, supra note 190, at 31). 
312 See Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy 
Transportation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 423, 491 (2017) (discussing how involving local 
stakeholders in in energy citing decisions “can improve the quality of the decision-
making process and [prevent] protracted, after-the-fact litigation.”). 
